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Abstract
Bayesian State Space Representation Model:
Applications to Macroeconomics and International Finance
by
Hiroshi Morita
This dissertation develops three new econometric models using Bayesian state space repre-
sentation model in order to apply to macroeconomics and international finance. It consists
of 3 chapters. Chapter 1 develops a Markov mixture model of macroeconomic fundamentals
to analyze the short-run dynamics of foreign exchange rates. In our model, foreign exchange
rates are simultaneously determined by three parities: the interest rate parity, the inflation
rate parity, and the equity return rate parity. Using four exchange rates: the U.S. dollar
price of the British pound, the German mark, the Japanese yen, and the Canadian dollar,
the findings are: (1) Our model better explains the short-run dynamics of the exchange
rates than a random walk with drift does. (2) The equity return is an important factor in
determining the exchange rates. In particular, a higher return in a home-country equity
market leads to depreciation of the home currency. (3) Our model can explain the short-run
movement of the exchange rates that may be caused by rare events, such as the Plaza Agree-
ment, the Asian and Russian financial crises, and the global financial crisis of 2008-2010.
(4) There is weak evidence that our model outperforms a driftless random walk in terms of
out-of-sample forecast errors for each currency on average over a 144-month period.
iv
Chapter 2 explores an econometric model of cross-country monetary transmission mech-
anism. We particularly examine the effect of the U.S. monetary policy shock on the other
Group of Seven (G-7) countries, and develop a panel version of the factor-augmented vec-
tor autoregressive (FAVAR) model, allowing both common and country-specific unobservable
factors. We also allow interdependency among the country-specific factors to produce the co-
movement of business cycles in the G-7 countries. The findings are that: (1) the existence of
such interdependency is statistically significant. (2) This interdependency reduces the mag-
nitude of U.S. business cycle. (3) After the contractionary U.S. monetary shock, Japan’s
output is affected most, followed by the Anglo-Saxon countries, the UK and Canada. The
continental European countries, Germany, France, and Italy, are the least affected among
them. (4) The results are consistent with international consumption risk sharing. (5) Our
2-country version of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model shows the evi-
dence of such risk sharing, and also suggests that the comovement of business cycles might
be as a result of foreign central bank reactions to the change in home monetary policy and
the exchange rate.
Chapter 3 proposes to examine a fiscal policy reaction function by remedying 2 issues
in existing literature. We allow the fiscal policy reaction to vary over time and take into
account endogeneities by casting the analysis in a multivariate framework. Our findings are:
(1) the response of the government’s primary surplus to a 1-percent exogenous debt shock
displays first a deterioration of the primary balance in 1981Q1-1991Q4 and 2001Q1-2008Q1.
It followed by a sustained improvement, consistent with the definition of a fiscally responsi-
ble policy. (2) However, there are the periods when there is a sustained improvement from
beginning without any deteriorations of the primary balance, that is in 1992Q1-2000Q4 and
2008Q2- 2013Q1. (3) These differences in the fiscal policy reactions might be due to recession
and wars. If some emergency expenditures are needed during recessions or wars, it would be
harder to make fiscal policy more sustainable. (4) The effect on output gap becomes more
v
negative during the resession along with no immediate reaction in fiscal policy to reduce the
level of debt in response to an exogenous debt shock. (5) The robustness test shows that our
time-varying coefficient model is more superior to the standard vector autoregressive (VAR)
model in terms of marginal density of data.
vi
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1 A Markov Mixture Approach to the Short-run Dynamics of Foreign Exchange
Rates
1.1 Introduction
In international macroeconomics and finance, many puzzles exist. One of the major ones is
the exchange-rate disconnect puzzle, which concerns the poor performance of macroeconomic
fundamentals, such as price levels and short-term interest rates, in explaining the short-run
dynamics of foreign exchange rates. Meese and Rogoff (1983a, b) conclude that none of the
economic models offered by the literature outperforms a driftless random walk in terms of
out-of-sample forecast errors, especially in a short horizon (one to twenty-four months). This
means that the best forecast of foreign exchange rates in the next period is no change from
its current value, and no macroeconomic variables perform as better predictors of forecasting
the short run.
In the countries under a flexible exchange rate regime, monetary policy may respond to
the change in exchange rates between the home currency and the trade partners’ currencies,
or the government may intervene in the foreign exchange market in response to economic
conditions (although it is controversial). Since foreign exchange rates tend to have a large
effect on the real economy particularly for small open economies, understanding the short-
run dynamics of exchange rates is vital for policy makers in many countries. In this paper,
we propose a model that can explain the short-run relations between exchange rates and
macroeconomic and financial variables, and outperform a driftless random walk in out-of-
sample forecasting.
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This paper’s approach differs in an important respect from existing literature in explain-
ing the short-run dynamics of foreign exchange rates. Instead of assuming a representative
agent, we develop a heterogeneous agent model: the first agent follows the interest-rate
parity, the second the inflation-rate parity, and the third the equity-return-rate parity. In
contrast, in the great majority of traditional studies, the purchasing power parity (PPP)
condition and the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition are examined separately.
In this paper, we examine whether foreign exchange rates are simultaneously determined by
these distinct parities.
To deal with these three distinct parities as the determinants of exchange rates together,
we employ a Markov mixture model (MMM). Although MMM is widely known as a Markov
switching model in economic literature, this paper follows the terminology of Chib (1996)
because it is the most appropriate for our purpose. Furthermore, he claims that MMM is
extremely useful to describe a nonlinear dynamics for modelling a complex form involving
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation - two important characteristics of macroeconomic
and financial variables.
Since Meese-Rogoff’s work, numerous attempts have been made to find a model that
better explains the short-run dynamics of foreign exchange rates. Yet, none of the existing
models has proven able to outperform a driftless random walk in out-of-sample forecasting,
and to overturn the Meese-Rogoff conclusion. Some models work well for some currencies
in some periods, but not for all the currencies in all periods.1 One possible explanation
for these puzzles would be the so-called peso problems, which means that, as Lewis (1994)
and Evans (1995) argue, rare events, such as financial crises and international agreements,
make it more difficult to understand the short-run dynamics of exchange rates and thus even
1Excellent surveys are found in Cheung, Chinn, and Pascual (2005) and Rogoff and Stavrakeva (2008).
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more difficult to predict their future values. This paper investigates whether our model can
explain the short-run movement of exchange rates caused by rare events.
Using four exchange rates: the US dollar (USD) price of the Japanese yen (JPY), the
German mark (DM), the British pound (GBP), and the Canadian dollar (CND), the find-
ings are: (1) Our model better explains the short-run dynamics of the exchange rates than a
random walk (with drift) does. (2) The equity return is an important factor in determining
the exchange rates, except for the Canadian dollar. In particular, a higher return in a home-
country equity market leads to depreciation of the home currency. (3) Our model can explain
the short-run movement of the exchange rates that may be caused by rare events, such as
the Plaza Agreement, the Asian/Russian financial crises, and the global financial crisis of
2008-2010. (4) There is weak evidence that our model outperforms a driftless random walk
in terms of out-of-sample forecast errors for each currency on the average over a 120-month
period.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a conceptual background, Section
3 explains the methodology, Section 4 describes the data, Section 5 presents statistical in-
ferences, and Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Conceptual Background
Several well known puzzles in foreign exchange (FX) are responsible for this view. First,
the ”exchange rate disconnect puzzle” concerns the empirical disconnect between exchange
rate movements and economic fundamentals such as money supply and real output (e.g.,
Mark, 1995; Cheung, Chinn and Pascual, 2005; Rogoff and Stavrakeva, 2008). Second, the
”forward premium puzzle” implies that on average the interest differential is not offset by
3
a commensurate depreciation of the investment currency, which is an empirical violation of
uncovered interest rate parity. As a result, borrowing in low-interest rate currencies and
investing in high-interest rate currencies forms the basis of the widely used carry trade strat-
egy in active currency management (e.g., Fama, 1984; Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski
and Rebelo, 2011; Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen, 2009; and Della Corte, Sarno and
Tsiakas, 2009). Third, there is extensive evidence that purchasing power parity only holds
in the very long run (e.g., Lothian and Taylor, 1996).
In the recent literature of exchange rates, there are four different approaches. The first
approach is an extension from an existing one. For example, Engel, Mark, and West (2007)
develop a monetary model using a panel regression, and Bacchetta, van Wincoop, and Beut-
ler (2010) develop a model with time-varying coefficients. The second approach involves the
macroeconomic models exemplified by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). These models are based
on a microeconomic foundation assuming a representative agent and rational expectations.
The third is the market microstructure model using order flows in foreign exchange markets
rather than macroeconomic variables, for example the model developed by Evans and Lyons
(2002). The fourth and last is the asset pricing model, such as the chartist and fundamental-
ist model, introduced by Frankel and Froot (1987). In particular, Ahrens and Reitz (2005)
develop a model of investors’ expectations switching mechanism using a Markov switching
model. In this paper, we follow the first approach except that we assume heterogeneous
agents. We also concentrate on observable macroeconomic and financial variables.
For the analysis of regime switching, Kim and Nelson (1999) apply MMM to business cy-
cles, and Sims and Zha (2006) apply it to monetary policy. In studying exchange rates, Engel
(1994) employs this model to characterize a 2-state regime switching between a random walk
with positive drift and one with negative drift. Dueker and Neely (2007) do so for a 2-state
regime switching between two different variances in the deviation from the UIP condition.
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However, ours is not a regime switching model, but a mixture model. We employ MMM
to test the hypothesis that exchange rates are simultaneously determined by the different
parities, and in the context of MMM, we treat each type of parity as an unobservable state.
These different unobservable states can occur simultaneously. We estimate the probabilities
of each unobservable state occurring over a sample period, allowing these probabilities to be
viewed as a time-varying weight of each parity.
The PPP condition might hold in the very long run, as the result of Lothian and Tay-
lor (2006) suggests. Yet, as Rogoff (1996) shows, the foreign exchange rates seem to move
very slowly to restore this condition. This behavior is known as the PPP puzzle. The UIP
condition predicts that a rise in home-country interest rate is associated with an expected
home currency depreciation. There is little empirical support for this as the results show an
expected home currency appreciation instead of the depreciation, an outcome known as the
UIP puzzle.2 More recently, Backus et al. (2010) argue that the UIP puzzle is a result of
optimal monetary policies in home and foreign countries if their Taylor rules are different,
which creates an arbitrage opportunity and thus the possibility of currency carry trades. In
fact, the transaction of currency carry trades has grown significantly since the mid-1990s,
when Japan’s short-term interest rate was nearly zero3. We test whether the UIP and PPP
conditions hold within one of the unobservable states in our model.
Recent studies have found evidence of exchange rate predictability using either panels or
innovative modeling approaches. Engel, Mark, and West (2008) use panel specifications of
the monetary, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and Taylor (1993) rule models, Rossi (2006)
uses the monetary model in the presence of a structural break, Gourinchas and Rey (2007)
use an external balance model, Molodtsova and Papell (2009) use a heterogeneous symmetric
2An excellent survey can be found in Hodrick (1987), for example.
3Speculators can make immediate profits when they borrow money in Japan at the nearly zero interest
rate, and then buy a currency with a higher return, such as the currencies of the US, Australia, and New
Zealand.
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Taylor rule model with smoothing, and Cerra and Saxena (2010) use a broad panel speci-
fication of the monetary model. However, Rogoff and Stavrakeva (2008) criticize the three
above-mentioned papers for their reliance on the Clark and West (2006) statistic, arguing
that it is not a minimum mean squared forecast error statistic.
As for the relation between foreign exchange markets and equity markets, it has been
the subject of ongoing debate. The classical theory of the portfolio-balance model, Frankel
(1983) for example, postulates a positive relation between equity prices and currency, i.e.,
a higher return in a home-country equity market is associated with a strong home currency.
There are some theories that show a negative correlation. However, Soenen and Hennigar
(1988) find a significant negative correlation, while Chow et al. (1997) even find no correla-
tion at all. Hau and Rey (2006) assume that the risk-free interest rates are constant in order
to shed light on the relations among exchange rates, equity prices and capital flows. Yet,
their model shows that a higher return in a home-country equity market is associated with
depreciation of the home currency. We examine what our model shows as to the relation
between equity prices and currency.
In this paper, we adopt Bayesian inference, as Kim and Nelson (1999), Sims and Zha
(2006), and Sims, Waggoner, and Zha (2008) have done. The primary reason is, as Albert
and Chib (1993) show, that MMM under Bayesian inference is more efficient than an EM-




1.3.1 Class of Model
Using the U.S. as the home country, let ∆e kt be a monthly percentage change in the spot
exchange rate - the U.S. dollar price of the kth foreign currency. Thus, an increase in e kt
indicates a depreciation of the U.S. dollar. Let it be the U.S. one-month interest rate, πt
the U.S. inflation rate, and rt the U.S. equity return rate. All three rates are on a monthly
basis. The foreign country variables are denoted i ∗t , π
∗
t , and r
∗
t .
In our model, the uncovered interest-rate parity (UIP), purchasing-power parity (PPP)
and uncovered equity-return-rate parity (UEP) simultaneously determine the exchange rates.
We assume that these parities are unobservable states denoted st. Thus, we label st = 1
as UIP , st = 2 as PPP, and st = 3 as UEP. Using a Markov mixture model (MMM), we


















β0,1 + (it − i ∗t ) + εt,1 (for st = 1: interest-rate state)
β0,2 + (πt − π ∗t ) + εt,2 (for st = 2: inflation-rate state)
β0,3 + (rt − r ∗t ) + εt,3 (for st = 3: equity-return-rate state)
(1.1)
where Et is the operator of expected value given information available up to time t, and
εt,s ∼ N(0, σ2s) (for s =1, 2, and 3). The symbol ∼ denotes ”drawn from.” Note that β0,s
(for s =1, 2, and 3) is a risk premium in each parity condition. We call this model in Equa-
tion 1.1 a 3-state MMM of fundamentals (3MMM), and test whether the equity returns are
important in determining the exchange rates. To do this, we take out the third unobserv-
able state, the UEP state, from Equation 1.1 to compare with 3MMM, and call it a 2-state
MMM of fundamentals (2MMM). We also compare those mixture models of fundamentals
with those of random walks as a benchmark. We name the 3-state of random walks as 3RW,
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and the 2-state of random walks as 2RW. Note that 2RW can be reduced to the model of
Engel (1994) if we restrict the signs of the intercepts, that is, one is positive (β0,1 > 0) and
another is negative (β0,2 < 0). Note that the PPP and the UEP conditions are based on
adaptive expectation, that is Etπt+1 = πt and Etrt+1 = rt, to avoid endogeneity bias
4.
1.3.2 Markov Mixture Model
This section describes general propositions of a Markov mixture model. We denote h as
the number of unobservable states, and assume that each unobservable state evolves ac-
cording to the first-order Markov chain with a transition probability denoted P and an
unconditional probability of each unobservable states at t = 0 denoted p0. The one-step




pst,st−1 = 1, and the initial unconditional probability p0 is an h-dimensional
























Prob(st = 1|st−1 = 1) Prob(st = 1|st−1 = 2) Prob(st = 1|st−1 = 3)
Prob(st = 2|st−1 = 1) Prob(st = 2|st−1 = 2) Prob(st = 2|st−1 = 3)







and p0 = [Prob(s0 = 1), Prob(s0 = 2), Prob(s0 = 3)]
′
In each period t, once the unobservable state st is realized, that is, given st = i, the
4When we deal with equity prices or its returns, as Rigobon and Sack (2003, 2004) argue, there is an
endogeneity bias between equity prices and short-term interest rates. They argue that it’s almost impossible
to find a valid instrumental variable which only affects equity prices, but not short-term interest rates
contemporaneously in a structural vector autoregressive model.
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observation yt is drawn from a population given by the conditional density:
yt | Yt−1, Zt, θ
(s) ∼ π(yt | Yt−1, Zt, θ
(s)) (1.2)
where π(·) is a probability density function throughout this paper, Yt = {y1, · · · , yt} ⊆ Rt,
Zt = {z1, · · · , zt} ⊆ Rn×t is n exogenous variables including a constant, θ(s) = {β(s), σ2,(s)}
is a (k + 1)-dimensional parameter vector of the model in the ith unobservable state,
β(s)(= [β0,i, β1,i, · · · , βk,i, ]
′) is a k-dimensional vector of the model parameters in the ith
unobservable state, and θ = ∪hi=1θ
(s) ∈ Θ ⊆ R(k+1)×h. Equation 1.2 is a generalized expres-
sion of our model in Equation 1.1.
Let us define a finite series of unobservable states as St = {s1, · · · , st}. We have three
important propositions:




pst,st−1 × Prob(st−1 | Yt−1, Zt−1, θ, P ) (1.3)
Prob(st | Yt, Zt−1, θ, P ) =
Prob(st | Yt−1, Zt−1, θ, P )× f(yt | Yt−1, Zt−1, θ, st)
∑h
st=1
{Prob(st | Yt−1, Zt−1, θ, P )× f(yt | Yt−1, Zt−1, θ, st)}
(1.4)
And
Prob(ST | YT , ZT , θ, P ) =
Prob(sT | Yt, Zt, θ, P )×
∏T−1
t=0 pst+1,stProb(st | Yt, Zt, θ, P )
∑h
st=1
{Prob(sT | Yt, Zt, θ, P )×
∏T−1
t=0 pst+1,stProb(st | Yt, Zt, θ, P )}
(1.5)
where p(·) is a probability mass function throughout this paper. The proof of these three
propositions above can be found in both Hamilton (1989) and Chib (1996). Using Equation
1.3, 1.4, and 1.5, and setting p(s1|Y0, θ) to be the stationary distribution of the Markov chain,
i.e., an eigenvector corresponding to a unit eigenvalue of the transition matrix P ,
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Let θ denote the parameters in Equation 1.1. Thus, θ = ∩hs=1{β0,s, σ
2
s}. Define Yt =
{∆ek1, ∆e
k
2, · · · , ∆e
k
t } and T as the end of the sample period. Given parameters θ, we
recursively obtain the filtered probability p(st|Yt, θ) and the smoothed probability p(st|YT , θ)
for t = 1, · · · , T in the same fashion as Hamilton (1989) and Chib(1996). In our model, the
filtered probabilities are the proportions of three different determinations of the exchange
rates. We need to emphasize that we use the filtered ones instead of smoothed ones used
in Markov-switching literature since our model is a mixture model. We are interested in
estimating the proportion of each unobservable state at time t given information available
up to time t, instead of given the entire sample (YT ).
1.3.3 Prior Distributions
We assume that the prior distributions of θ and P are independent of each other, as in
Hamilton (1989), Chib (1996) and many others. We also assume that the joint distributions
of βs and σ
2
s (for s = 1, 2 and 3) are independent across the unobservable state, and that
the joint distribution of βs in the model is a multivariate normal distribution given σ
2
s , and
that each σ2s follows an inverse-gamma distribution in each unobservable state, as follows:




where IG and N are an inverse-gamma distribution5 and a multivariate normal distribution,
respectively. β0,s is the prior mean vector of β0,s, Σs is the prior covariance matrix of β0,s,
and δs and νs are the prior parameters in the sth unobservable state.
Defining ps as the sth column of the transition matrix P , we assume that the distributions
5Note that IG(δ, ν) = G(ν/2, 2/δ) = δνxν−1 exp(−x/2)/Γ(ν) where G is the gamma distribution and Γ(·)
is a standard gamma function.
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of ps for s = 1, 2, · · · , h are independent, and:
ps ∼ D(α1,s, · · · , αh,s)
where D is the Dirichlet distribution6 and αi,s (i = 1, 2, · · · , h) are its prior parameters.
1.3.4 Posterior Simulation
This paper employs the method of Chib (1996), which makes computations tractable by
simulation of a finite series of unobservable states over the sample period ST = {s1, · · · , sT}.
Chib shows the class of models that has the analytical solutions of the full conditional density
θ | YT , ZT , P, ST and P | YT , ZT , θ, ST , once ST is drawn from ST | YT , ZT , θ, P . Hence, it
is easy to implement the Gibb sampler. Note that ZT = {z1, z2, · · · , zT} is a vector of
exogenous variables. In each output of the Gibbs sampler, we have:
σ2s | YT , ZT , βs, P, ST ∼ IG
(









≡ IG(ν∗s , δ
∗
s) (1.6)
β0,s | YT , ZT , σ
2































Ts is the number of periods when the sth unobservable state occurs, and I[st = i] is an
indicator vector whose elements take the value 1 if st = i and 0 otherwise. The full conditional
density of ps becomes:
ps | YT , ZT , θ, ST ∼ D(α1,s + n1,s, · · · , αh,s + nh,s) (1.8)









i=1 Γ(αs). In the Dirichlet distribution, xi is normalized so that their values add up
to 1.
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where ni,s is the number of transitions from st−1 = s to st = i in the simulated series of
unobservable states. To obtain the posterior moments of θ| YT , ZT and P | YT , ZT , we adapt
the Gibbs sampler for the Markov-chain Monte Carlo simulation by iterating Equation 1.6,
1.7 and 1.8.
1.3.5 Approximation Method of Marginal Density of Data
To compute marginal density of data (MDD), we begin with the posterior density function
of parameter:
π(θ̃, P̃ | YT , ZT ) =
π(YT | ZT , θ̃, P̃ ) π(θ̃, P̃ | ZT )
∫
Θ×P
π(YT | ZT , θ̃, P̃ ) π(θ̃, P̃ | ZT ) dθdP
=
π(YT | ZT , θ̃, P̃ ) π(θ̃, P̃ | ZT )
π(YT | ZT )
where π(·) is a probability density function, and θ̃ is any θ ∈ Θ and P̃ is any P ∈ P. Then,
the MDD can be written as follow:
π(YT | ZT ) =
π(YT | ZT , θ̃, P̃ ) π(θ̃, P̃ | ZT )
π(θ̃, P̃ | YT , ZT )
(1.9)
log π(YT | ZT ) = log π(YT | ZT , θ̃, P̃ ) + log π(θ̃, P̃ | ZT )− log π(θ̃, P̃ | YT , ZT )
(1.10)
We approximate MDDs using Chib’s (1995) method. In this method, we decompose the
posterior density. To compute the numerator of MDD in Equation 1.9 is a straightforward
task. Since θ and P is independent of ZT , the prior density becomes:
π(θ∗, P ∗| ZT ) = π(θ
∗, P ∗) (1.11)
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For the likelihood density π(YT | ZT , θ
∗, P ∗),
π(YT | ZT , θ








π(yt| Yt−1, Zt, θ




The proof of Equation 1.12 can be found in Sims, Waggoner, and Zha (2008). We approxi-
mate the posterior density π(θ∗, P ∗| YT , ZT ), which is the denominator of Equation 1.9, by
decomposing it. Although there are several ways to do it, we choose the one that requires
the fewest additional computations, which is close to Kim and Nelson (1999), as follows:
π(θ∗, P ∗| YT , ZT ) = π(β
∗, σ2∗, P ∗| YT , ZT )
= π(β∗| YT , ZT )π(σ
2∗| YT , ZT , β






π(β∗s | YT , ZT )π(σ
2∗









Due to the ergodicity theorem, one can obtain the following almost sure convergence in three











T ) −→a.s. π(β
∗
s | YT , ZT )
where M is the number of iterations in the Gibbs sampler, S ∋ ST , and Ω ∋ σ2s .





T ) is already available in the outputs in the Gibbs sam-
pler, obtaining this approximation requires no additional effort. However, we need to run











T ) −→a.s. π(σ
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T ) −→a.s. π(p
∗







T ∼ ST | YT , ZT , β
∗, σ2∗, P ∗.
1.4 Data
The sample consists of monthly time series from 1979M1 to 2012M12. The monthly per-
centage change of spot exchange rate ∆e kt is the U.S. dollar (USD) price of the kth foreign
currency at time t: British pound (GBP), German mark (DM), Japanese yen (JPY) and
Canadian dollar (CND). Thus, an increase in e kt indicates a depreciation of the U.S. dollar.
The expression it denotes the U.S. one-month interest rate on euro deposits at time t,
and i ∗t the foreign country’s - UK, Germany, Japan and Canada. Since we use monthly
percentage change for the exchange rates, the one-month interest rates are on a monthly
basis to avoid distortion from the expectation hypothesis of term structure (EHTS).7
The expression πt denotes the U.S. monthly inflation rate, which is a percentage in
price level between time t− 1 and t, and π ∗t for the foreign countries. We use the producers’
price index (PPI) for the U.S., and the wholesale price index (WPI) for the other countries.8.
The expression rt denotes the U.S. monthly equity return rate, which is a percentage
change in share price between time t − 1 and t, and r ∗t for the foreign countries. For
Germany, data before 1991 are from West Germany. After 1999, the USD-to-Euro exchange
rate is merged with the USD-to-DM exchange rate, the inflation rate is for the entire Euro
area, and the equity return rate is a GDP-weighted average of the rates in Germany, France,
7See more details about the relation between exchange rates and EHTS in Bakaert and Hodrick (2001).
8Using PPI/WPI for price level is a standard procedure in the PPP literature, e.g., Rogoff (1996).
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Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands. The data summary is presented in Table 1.1 and 1.2.
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Table 1.1: Data Summary (1)
Variable Mean Std.dev Min Max
∆e GBPt -.00058 .03034 -.12769 .13135
∆e DM−EUROt .00067 .03247 -.12174 .09317
∆e JPYt .00235 .03220 -.11392 .15009
∆e CNDt .00035 .01957 -.13780 .08555
US
it .00503 .00336 .00018 .01609
pt .00261 .00928 -.05332 .02986
qt .00751 .03641 -.17432 .10645
UK
i ∗t .00657 .00359 .00042 .01536
p ∗t .00327 .00453 -.01099 .02657
q ∗t .00727 .03996 -.23137 .10644
it − i ∗t -.00154 .00192 -.00752 .00521
pt − p ∗t -.00065 .00821 -.04539 .03098
qt − q ∗t .00024 .02974 -.10541 .11225
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Table 1.2: Data Summary (2)
Variable Mean Std.dev Min Max
Germany
i ∗t .00356 .00261 .00070 .01167
p ∗t .00018 .00426 -.02026 .01565
q ∗t .00516 .04694 -.22434 .14805
it − i ∗t .00147 .00245 -.00537 .00839
pt − p ∗t .00084 .00755 -.04561 .02498
qt − q
∗
t .00236 .04288 -.13095 .18674
Japan
i ∗t .00259 .00270 .00003 .01157
p ∗t .00228 .00464 -.01969 .03106
q ∗t .00232 .04539 -.21643 .14294
it − i ∗t .00244 .00209 -.00333 .00947
pt − p ∗t .00238 .00839 -.00336 .03184
qt − q
∗
t .00519 .04235 -.14791 .18751
Canada
i ∗t .00561 .00365 .00025 .01838
p ∗t .00247 .00696 -.02875 .03858
q ∗t .00660 .04298 -.21496 .14265
it − i ∗t -.00058 .00134 -.00443 .00422
pt − p ∗t .00015 .00845 -.05159 .03161
qt − q
∗




We estimate the posterior moments of the parameters in the model in (1), using the Gibbs
sampler as a posterior simulation, as discussed in Section 3.3. In this simulation, each draw
is iterated 24,000 times and the first 4,000 iterations are discarded9 Then, we choose a thin-
ning parameter of 2 so that only every second draw was kept in order to reduce potential
autocorrelation of the sequence in the Gibbs sampler. The starting points of parameters
and the prior distribution of βs (s = 1, 2, and 3) are set to be agnostic: zero means and
unit variances. For the parameters in the other prior distributions, we set αi,s = 6 if i = s
(i = 1, 2, and 3), 2 otherwise, νs = 3, and δs = 0.001. The starting points of P and σ
2 are
the means implied by their prior distributions.
We report the posterior moments of the parameters in Equation 1.1 in Tables 1.3, 1.4, 1.5
and 1.6 for the British pound, the German mark/Euro, the Japanese yen and the Canadian
dollar respectively. We also report the trace plots and posterior density functions for all four
exchange rates in Figure 1.1 to 1.20.
9In this computation, I used R version 3.0.3 along with the packages coda and MCMCPack.
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Table 1.3: Posterior Moment: 3-state MMM (GBP)
Prior Posterior
Parameters Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 66% Interval
β0,1 0 1 -0.0041 0.0162 (-0.0090, 0.0032)
β0,2 0 1 -0.0020 0.0128 (-0.0029, 0.0027)
β0,3 0 1 -0.0051 0.0184 (-0.0142, 0.0062)
σ21 0.00050 0.00097 0.00116 0.00075 (0.00049, 0.00163)
σ22 0.00050 0.00097 0.00089 0.00069 (0.00045, 0.00123)
σ23 0.00050 0.00097 0.00139 0.00069 (0.00088, 0.00178)
p1,1 0.600 0.145 0.711 0.168 (0.592, 0.859)
p2,1 0.200 0.120 0.109 0.101 (0.038, 0.145)
p3,1 0.200 0.120 0.177 0.120 (0.084, 0.247)
p1,2 0.200 0.120 0.145 0.117 (0.053, 0.211)
p2,2 0.600 0.145 0.777 0.164 (0.668, 0.908)
p3,2 0.200 0.120 0.178 0.120 (0.083, 0.249)
p1,3 0.200 0.120 0.144 0.110 (0.055, 0.206)
p2,3 0.200 0.120 0.114 0.106 (0.036, 0.157)
p3,3 0.600 0.145 0.645 0.156 (0.538, 0.757)
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Table 1.4: Posterior Moment: 3-state MMM (DM-EURO)
Prior Posterior
Parameters Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 66% Interval
β0,1 0 1 0.0023 0.0137 (-0.0079, 0.0131)
β0,2 0 1 -0.0025 0.0119 (-0.0103, 0.0032)
β0,3 0 1 0.0008 0.0136 (-0.0090, 0.0116)
σ21 0.00050 0.00097 0.00101 0.00056 (0.00059, 0.00141)
σ22 0.00050 0.00097 0.00093 0.00057 (0.00052, 0.00131)
σ23 0.00050 0.00097 0.00108 0.00058 (0.00063, 0.00151)
p1,1 0.600 0.145 0.629 0.138 (0.543 , 0.730)
p2,1 0.200 0.120 0.176 0.104 (0.099, 0.234)
p3,1 0.200 0.120 0.188 0.117 (0.099, 0.252)
p1,2 0.200 0.120 0.188 0.113 (0.103, 0.252)
p2,2 0.600 0.145 0.633 0.139 (0.541, 0.737)
p3,2 0.200 0.120 0.190 0.112 (0.107, 0.271)
p1,3 0.200 0.120 0.182 0.109 (0.100, 0.247)
p2,3 0.200 0.120 0.191 0.114 (0.105, 0.258)
p3,3 0.600 0.145 0.621 0.144 (0.528, 0.729)
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Table 1.5: Posterior Moment: 3-state MMM (JPY)
Prior Posterior
Parameters Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 66% Interval
β0,1 0 1 0.0045 0.0147 (-0.0074, 0.0146)
β0,2 0 1 0.0024 0.0134 (-0.0077, 0.0110)
β0,3 0 1 0.0057 0.0143 (-0.0069, 0.0166)
σ21 0.00050 0.00097 0.00096 0.00052 (0.00053, 0.00129)
σ22 0.00050 0.00097 0.00101 0.00055 (0.00056, 0.00137)
σ23 0.00050 0.00097 0.00098 0.00052 (0.00055, 0.00131)
p1,1 0.600 0.145 0.613 0.137 (0.518, 0.714)
p2,1 0.200 0.120 0.199 0.114 (0.112, 0.268)
p3,1 0.200 0.120 0.189 0.111 (0.105, 0.254)
p1,2 0.200 0.120 0.197 0.112 (0.109, 0.268)
p2,2 0.600 0.145 0.599 0.141 (0.504, 0.702)
p3,2 0.200 0.120 0.187 0.107 (0.105, 0.251)
p1,3 0.200 0.120 0.190 0.111 (0.104, 0.256)
p2,3 0.200 0.120 0.201 0.115 (0.114, 0.269)
p3,3 0.600 0.145 0.624 0.135 (0.537, 0.722)
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Table 1.6: Posterior Moment: 3-state MMM (CND)
Prior Posterior
Parameters Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 66% Interval
β0,1 0 1 -0.0113 0.0395 (-0.0090, 0.0059)
β0,2 0 1 -0.0008 0.0008 (-0.0014, -0.0003)
β0,3 0 1 -0.0087 0.0465 (-0.0049, 0.0063)
σ21 0.00050 0.00097 0.00147 0.00109 (0.00059, 0.00206)
σ22 0.00050 0.00097 0.00019 0.00002 (0.00018, 0.00020)
σ23 0.00050 0.00097 0.00127 0.00101 (0.00056, 0.00174)
p1,1 0.600 0.145 0.703 0.192 (0.550, 0.884)
p2,1 0.200 0.120 0.016 0.129 (0.007, 0.021)
p3,1 0.200 0.120 0.172 0.141 (0.055, 0.261)
p1,2 0.200 0.120 0.101 0.095 (0.033, 0.138)
p2,2 0.600 0.145 0.968 0.187 (0.959, 0.981)
p3,2 0.200 0.120 0.091 0.093 (0.027, 0.122)
p1,3 0.200 0.120 0.195 0.149 (0.065, 0.296)
p2,3 0.200 0.120 0.016 0.128 (0.007, 0.021)
p3,3 0.600 0.145 0.737 0.188 (0.588, 0.903)
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Figure 1.1: Trace Plots and Posterior Density for GBP (1)
(a) Trace Plot of β0,1 (b) Posterior Density of β0,1
(c) Trace Plot of β0,2 (d) Posterior Density of β0,2
(e) Trace Plot of β0,3 (f) Posterior Density of β0,3
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Figure 1.2: Trace Plots and Posterior Density for GBP (2)
(a) Trace Plot of σ21 (b) Posterior Density of σ
2
1
(c) Trace Plot of σ22 (d) Posterior Density of σ
2
2
(e) Trace Plot of σ2
3
(f) Posterior Density of σ2
3
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Figure 1.3: Trace Plots and Posterior Density for GBP (3)
(a) Trace Plot of p1,1 (b) Posterior Density of p1,1
(c) Trace Plot of p1,2 (d) Posterior Density of p1,2
(e) Trace Plot of p1,3 (f) Posterior Density of p1,3
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Figure 1.4: Trace Plots and Posterior Density for GBP (4)
(a) Trace Plot of p2,1 (b) Posterior Density of p2,1
(c) Trace Plot of p2,2 (d) Posterior Density of p2,2
(e) Trace Plot of p2,3 (f) Posterior Density of p2,3
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Figure 1.5: Trace Plots and Posterior Density for GBP (5)
(a) Trace Plot of p3,1 (b) Posterior Density of p3,1
(c) Trace Plot of p3,2 (d) Posterior Density of p3,2
(e) Trace Plot of p3,3 (f) Posterior Density of p3,3
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Figure 1.6: Trace Plots and Posterior Density for DM-EURO (1)
(a) Trace Plot of β0,1 (b) Posterior Density of β0,1
(c) Trace Plot of β0,2 (d) Posterior Density of β0,2
(e) Trace Plot of β0,3 (f) Posterior Density of β0,3
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Figure 1.7: Trace Plots and Posterior Density for DM-EURO (2)
(a) Trace Plot of σ21 (b) Posterior Density of σ
2
1
(c) Trace Plot of σ22 (d) Posterior Density of σ
2
2
(e) Trace Plot of σ2
3
(f) Posterior Density of σ2
3
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Figure 1.8: Trace Plots and Posterior Density for DM-EURO (3)
(a) Trace Plot of p1,1 (b) Posterior Density of p1,1
(c) Trace Plot of p1,2 (d) Posterior Density of p1,2
(e) Trace Plot of p1,3 (f) Posterior Density of p1,3
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Figure 1.9: Trace Plots and Posterior Density for DM-EURO (4)
(a) Trace Plot of p2,1 (b) Posterior Density of p2,1
(c) Trace Plot of p2,2 (d) Posterior Density of p2,2
(e) Trace Plot of p2,3 (f) Posterior Density of p2,3
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Figure 1.10: Trace Plots and Posterior Density for DM-EURO (5)
(a) Trace Plot of p3,1 (b) Posterior Density of p3,1
(c) Trace Plot of p3,2 (d) Posterior Density of p3,2
(e) Trace Plot of p3,3 (f) Posterior Density of p3,3
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Figure 1.11: Trace Plots and Posterior Density for JPY (1)
(a) Trace Plot of β0,1 (b) Posterior Density of β0,1
(c) Trace Plot of β0,2 (d) Posterior Density of β0,2
(e) Trace Plot of β0,3 (f) Posterior Density of β0,3
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Figure 1.12: Trace Plots and Posterior Density for JPY (2)
(a) Trace Plot of σ21 (b) Posterior Density of σ
2
1
(c) Trace Plot of σ22 (d) Posterior Density of σ
2
2
(e) Trace Plot of σ2
3
(f) Posterior Density of σ2
3
34
Figure 1.13: Trace Plots and Posterior Density for JPY (3)
(a) Trace Plot of p1,1 (b) Posterior Density of p1,1
(c) Trace Plot of p1,2 (d) Posterior Density of p1,2
(e) Trace Plot of p1,3 (f) Posterior Density of p1,3
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Figure 1.14: Trace Plots and Posterior Density for JPY (4)
(a) Trace Plot of p2,1 (b) Posterior Density of p2,1
(c) Trace Plot of p2,2 (d) Posterior Density of p2,2
(e) Trace Plot of p2,3 (f) Posterior Density of p2,3
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Figure 1.15: Trace Plots and Posterior Density for JPY (5)
(a) Trace Plot of p3,1 (b) Posterior Density of p3,1
(c) Trace Plot of p3,2 (d) Posterior Density of p3,2
(e) Trace Plot of p3,3 (f) Posterior Density of p3,3
37
Figure 1.16: Trace Plots and Posterior Density for CND (1)
(a) Trace Plot of β0,1 (b) Posterior Density of β0,1
(c) Trace Plot of β0,2 (d) Posterior Density of β0,2
(e) Trace Plot of β0,3 (f) Posterior Density of β0,3
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Figure 1.17: Trace Plots and Posterior Density for CND (2)
(a) Trace Plot of σ21 (b) Posterior Density of σ
2
1
(c) Trace Plot of σ22 (d) Posterior Density of σ
2
2
(e) Trace Plot of σ2
3
(f) Posterior Density of σ2
3
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Figure 1.18: Trace Plots and Posterior Density for CND (3)
(a) Trace Plot of p1,1 (b) Posterior Density of p1,1
(c) Trace Plot of p1,2 (d) Posterior Density of p1,2
(e) Trace Plot of p1,3 (f) Posterior Density of p1,3
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Figure 1.19: Trace Plots and Posterior Density for CND (4)
(a) Trace Plot of p2,1 (b) Posterior Density of p2,1
(c) Trace Plot of p2,2 (d) Posterior Density of p2,2
(e) Trace Plot of p2,3 (f) Posterior Density of p2,3
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Figure 1.20: Trace Plots and Posterior Density for CND (5)
(a) Trace Plot of p3,1 (b) Posterior Density of p3,1
(c) Trace Plot of p3,2 (d) Posterior Density of p3,2
(e) Trace Plot of p3,3 (f) Posterior Density of p3,3
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We also report the proportions of 3 unobservable states in each period in Figure 1.21,
1.22, 1.23 and 1.24 for GBP, DM-EURO, JPY and CND, respectively. These proportions
are filtered probabilities of unobservable states in the Markov mixture model. Again, we
emphasize that we use the filtered ones.
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1.5.2 Relations to Economic Events
For GBP, Figure 1.21 shows that the UEP state becomes the most important determinant in
some occasions, especially in the late 1979, the early 1981, the mid 1983, the late 1985, the
early 1991 and the mid 1992. The late 1979 is the time of the energy crisis after the Iranian
Revolution. The late 1985 was the time of the Plaza Accord among the G-5 countries. The
early 1991 is the time of the global recession including the UK and the U.S. The mid 1992
is the time of the 1992 crisis when the UK withdrew from the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM), a part of the European Monetary System (EMS). This event appears to
be a turning point for GBP. In the period of 1981 to 1992, the PPP is the most influential
to the price of GBP, However, after this event, the UIP becomes the most influential. This
trend continues during the UK economic expansion, and abruptly ends in the late 2008, the
beginning of the global financial crisis of 2008-2010.
For DM-EURO, Figure 1.22 shows that, just like GBP, the UEP occasionally becomes
more influential than the UIP and the PPP. Especially, it occurred in the mid 1992, the
late 2008 and the mid 2010. Like GBP, the 1992 crisis makes the UEP the most important
determinant of DM-EURO. Other than this event, it also occurs in the time of the global
financial crisis of 2008-2010, and in the time of the Greek debt crisis.
For JPY, Figure 1.23 shows that the UIP and the PPP are primary determinants in most
of the periods, while the UEP is the least important determinant, like GBP and DM-EURO.
However, the UEP becomes the most influential to JPY in 1995, the late 1998 and the late
2008, which corresponds to the devaluation of the Mexican peso followed by its currency
crisis, the Asian/Russian financial crisis, and the global financial crisis, respectively.
For CND, Figure 1.24 shows that the PPP is the most important determinant until 2007.
This dominance is prominent unlike the other currencies. After 2007, the UIP sometimes
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becomes the most important determinant. This period coincides with the Canadian central
bank’s monetary expansion in response to the U.S. subprime mortgage turmoil of 2007-2008
and the global financial crisis of 2008-2010. At the time of the global financial crisis, the
UEP becomes most influential, just like DM-EURO and JPY. Other these events, the energy
crisis of 1979 makes the UIP the most influential.
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1.5.3 Robustness Checks
For robustness checks, we compute the marginal density of data (MDD)10 denoted p(YT |ZT )
for our 3-state MMM of fundamentals (3MMM). Then, we compute the MDD of 2-state
MMM of fundamentals (2MMM) by taking out the third unobservable state, the UEP state,











β0,1 + (it − i ∗t ) + εt,1 (for st = 1: interest-rate state)
β0,2 + (πt − π
∗
t ) + εt,2 (for st = 2: inflation-rate state)
(1.14)
We also compute the MDDs of the 3-state MMM of random walks (3RW) and the 2-state
MMM of random walks (2RW) as benchmarks.
Table 1.7 shows the natural logarithm of MDDs of four models for each currency along
with in-sample root mean squared forecast error (RMSFE). In Table 2, for each currency,
Row 1 presents the results of a random walk with drift (RW) as a benchmark, Row 2 does
the same for 2RW, Row 3 for 3RW, Row 4 for 2MMM, and Row 5 for 3MMM.
Our results suggest that the MDDs of 2MMM are higher than those of 2RW or RW
for all four currencies. These results suggest that 2MMM is a superior model to RW or
2RW in explaining the short-run dynamics of these exchange rates. Furthermore, in Table 2,
3MMMs have higher MDDs than 3RW or 2MMM in all currencies, indicating that 3MMM is
the best model for all currencies. This implies that the equity returns are important factors
in determining these four exchange rates.
10This is also called marginal likelihood of data, but in this paper we follow the terminology of Sims and
Zha (2006).
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Table 1.7: Marginal Density of Data and In-sample RMSFE
Currency Model log MDD In-sample RMSFE
GBP Random Walk 662.08 .03016
2-state MMM of random walks (2RW) 831.14 .02978
3-state MMM of random walks (3RW) 824.24 .02982
2-state MMM of fundamentals (2MMM) 833.09 .02905
3-state MMM of fundamentals (3MMM) 874.59(*) .02355
DM-EURO Random Walk 647.43 .04765
2-state MMM of random walks (2RW) 794.12 .03204
3-state MMM of random walks (3RW) 799.18 .03171
2-state MMM of fundamentals (2MMM) 798.20 .3029
3-state MMM of fundamentals (3MMM) 800.52(*) .02859
JPY Random Walk 648.57 .03157
2-state MMM of random walks (2RW) 795.59 .03024
3-state MMM of random walks (3RW) 799.18 .03161
2-state MMM of fundamentals (2MMM) 800.04 .02930
3-state MMM of fundamentals (3MMM) 802.39(*) .02846
CND Random Walk 804.66 .01957
2-state MMM of random walks (2RW) 1021.48 .01929
3-state MMM of random walks (3RW) 1021.53 .02044
2-state MMM of fundamentals (2MMM) 1030.67 .01865
3-state MMM of fundamentals (3MMM) 1034.39(*) .01831
Note: (*) denotes a highest value.
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1.5.4 Out-of-sample Forecasting
We conduct the procedure of out-of-sample forecasting to see if our model outperform a drit-
less random walk. Following the procedure proposed by Albert and Chib (1993), we simulate
sT as the last element of a series of unobservable states ST . Using sT , then, we draw sT+1
from the transition probability psT+1,sT in each iteration of the Gibbs sampler, and obtain
∆eT+1 from Equation 1.1. At the end of the Gibbs sampler, we estimate ET (∆eT+1).
We follow the standard procedure of out-of-sample forecasting as described in most re-
lated papers, such as Rogoff and Starvrakeva (2008) and Molodsova and Papell (2009), using
a rolling regression. We forecast the one-period-ahead value of the percentage change of the
exchange rates. We utilize the best model for 4 currencies in out-of-sample forecasting, that
is, 3MMM for GBP, DM-EURO, and JPY and CND. In forecasting, we conduct a rolling
regression with a forecast window of 2001M1 to 2012M12. This means that, for example,
the sample period 1979M1-2000M12 is used to forecast for 2001M1, 1979M2-2001M1 for
2001M2, and so on. Thus, the 144-time posterior simulations described above are required
to forecast one-month-ahead values for each currency. For comparison with the forecastabil-
ity of a driftless random walk, we compute the Theil’s U (TU ) statistic, which is the root
mean square forecast error (RMSFE) of the model divided by that of a driftless random
walk. Therefore, when the TU -statistic is less than 1, the model outperforms a driftless
random walk in out-of-sample forecasting.
Since we employ Bayesian inference, unlike other literature, such as Rogoff and Starvrakeva
(2008), we compute the TU statistic in the Gibbs sampler. Thus, Table 1.8 shows the me-
dian of TU statistic over the 144-month forecast window along with the 55%, 66% and
95% quartiles. According to Table 1.8, the medians of TU -statistics are 0.779, 0.831, 0.873
and 0.870 for GBP, DM-EURO, JPY and CND, respectively. Table 1.8 also shows that the
upper bounds of the 50% quartiles are still less than one for all currencies. These results
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suggest that our mixture model of fundamentals outperforms a driftless random walk for all
currencies in terms of median and the 50% quartile.
However, in Table 1.8, the upper bounds of the 66% quartiles are slightly greater than
one, indicating that our model fails to outperform the driftless random walk at slightly more
than 34% of time over the forecast window. Also, from the upper bounds of the 95% quartile
in Table 1.8, the forecast error of our model is 3.616 times greater than the driftless random
walk for the U.S. dollar price of GBP at less than 5% of time over the forecast window, 5.605
times for DM-EURO, 1.479 times for JPY and 1.834 times for CND.
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Table 1.8: Results in Out-of-sample Forecasting
Logarithm of TU -statistic
Currency Median 50% Quartile 66% Quartile
GBP -0.249 (-0.432, -0.102) (-0.970, 0.225)
DM-EURO -0.185 (-0.372, -0.066) (-0.669, 0.318)
JPY -0.135 (-0.265, -0.068) (-0.531, 0.098)
CND -0.139 (-0.324, -0.033) (-0.802, 0.103)
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In this paper, we characterized the short-run dynamics of foreign exchange rates. For this
purpose, we proposed a new approach to deal with three distinct parity conditions of ex-
change rates which may occur simultaneously. Based upon the empirical results for the
British pound, the German mark, the Japanese yen, and the Canadian dollar, the findings
are (1) Our model significantly better explains the short-run dynamics of the exchange rates
than a random walk does. (2) The equity return is an important factor in determining the
exchange rates for all four currencies. (3) The model shows an interesting relation to actual
events in history, such as international agreements and the financial crises. (4) The mixture
model of fundamentals outperforms a driftless random walk in terms of out-of-sample fore-
cast errors for each currency on average over a 120-month period, although the results may
not be statistically significant.
Of course, there is a limitation to forecasting the future values of foreign exchange rates
when rare events like a financial crisis occur. However, our approach presents two main ad-
vantages for policy making purposes. First, the model we develop in this paper may be able
to explain the short-run dynamics right after rare events occur because one of unobservable
states captures these events. Second, the model depends on macroeconomic/financial vari-
ables that are observable, instead of unobservable factors, such as expectations. Therefore,
it is easy to apply the model to policy making decisions. While we need to improve the ac-
curacy of out-of-sample forecasting, our approach could be adopted to explain the short-run
dynamics of exchange rates for policy-making purposes.
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The conventional view among policy makers is that, at least in the short run, monetary
policy can influence the real economy. In fact, recent empirical evidence supports the sem-
inal work by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) that the effect of monetary policy on the real
economy may last for at least two years (See Bernanke and Mikov, 1998). However, there
is no consensus over how much monetary policy exerts its influence. The main reason for
the disagreement is the differences in model specifications adopted in these analyses. Since
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Sims (1992), many researchers employed standard vector
autoregression (VAR) to identify and measure the effects of monetary policy innovation on
macroeconomic variables. However, a different identification strategy leads to quite different
inference in the analysis.
A more critical problem with the existing studies is that they are highly constrained
by the dimension of the VAR system and, therefore, can consider only a limited number
of variables affecting monetary policy decisions. Thus, the set of limited control variables
considerably varies from one study to another. It is a well-known fact that central banks
consider a large set of variables in assessing and forecasting economic conditions before im-
plementing their monetary policies. Moreover, monetary policy transmission occurs through
various channels, such as the interest rate channel, the exchange rate channel, and the credit
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channel. Thus, the ”omitted variable bias” might lead to biased inference, such as the ”price
puzzle” (Sims, 1992) that a contractionary monetary policy shock is followed by a rise in
price level instead of a fall. For this reason, the factor-augmented vector autoregressive
(FAVAR) has been gaining popularity in analyzing monetary transmission since Stock and
Watson (2005a) and Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005). Their works reduce over a hun-
dred variables into a couple of unobservable factors to deal with the curse of dimensionality.
However, most of literature concentrates on a single country or regional analysis.
In this paper, we explore a cross-country monetary transmission mechanism. We par-
ticularly examine whether the interdependency among the G-7 economic variables plays a
significant role in the cross-country monetary transmission of a monetary policy shock orig-
inating in the United States. Following the terminology of Forbes and Rigobon (2002),
contagion is due to significant changes in shocks, such as financial crises, while interdepen-
dency simply refers to correlations among countries’ macroeconomic variables. This paper
focuses on the latter.
This paper has four contributions. First, we develop a general class of panel-FAVAR
model. This is a new methodology that is more suitable for analyzing cross-country ef-
fects among the G-7 countries than a standard VAR or a non-panel FAVAR, since it allows
modelling a large number of variables and cross-country variations simultaneously. When
examining the monetary transmission mechanism in an open economy context, leaving out
the interdependency as majority of literature does, could distort results severely. Second, we
systematically examine the interdependency among the country-specific unobservable fac-
tors, which produces the comovement of business cycles among the G-7 countries widely
documented in literature. We test whether the existence of such interdependency is signif-
icant. Third, we examine the robustness of this model, using Bayesian marginal density of
data, to check whether the number of factors is optimized. This is a point that has not
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been paid attention in the literature, yet can crucially affect the results. Finally, we extend
a 2-country version of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) of Fererro, Gertler,
and Svensson (2008), and compare it with our empirical results. We show that the results of
our DSGE model are consistent with our panel-FAVAR analysis in terms of business cycle
comovement.
Our findings are: (1) The model with such interdependency is superior to the one without
it. (2) Such interdependency reduces the magnitude of U.S. business cycle. This suggests
that most of VAR or FAVAR literature of the U.S. monetary transmission mechanism with-
out interdependency across countries, might overstate the effect on the U.S. real economy.
This view is consistent with the argument of Sims and Zha (2006) among many others that
the effect of monetary policy on the real economy might be very little. (3) As a result of
interdependency, the effects on the other G-7 countries’ real economy are similar, although
there are differences in magnitude. For example, after the contractionary U.S. monetary
shock, Japan’s output was affected most, followed by the Anglo-Saxon countries, the UK
and Canada. The continental European countries, Germany, France, and Italy, were the
least affected among them. (4) The consumption in each country fell less than its own out-
put. This result is consistent with international consumption risk sharing documented in
many existing literature. (5) Our 2-country DSGE model shows the evidence of such risk
sharing, and also suggests that the comovement of business cycles might be because the




Since the studies by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Sims (1992), the VAR model has
been the workhorse of monetary transmission literature among researchers and policy mak-
ers. However, recently, the limitations of a typical VAR system came to the front, as being
severely restricted by the relatively small number of variables in order to conserve degrees
of freedom. Central banks follow a large number of indicators to monitor the monetary and
financial pressures in the markets when they implement the monetary policy. Moreover, the
monetary transmission may occur through various channels: the interest-rate channel (Sims,
1992, Leeper, Sims, and Zha, 1996, Sims and Zha, 1998, 2005); the exchange rate channel
(Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995, Kim and Roubini, 2000, Kim, 2001, Canova, 2005, Scholl
and Uhlig, 2006); and the credit channel (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999). Thus, a
limited-dimension VAR creates an ”omitted variable bias”, which might lead to biased infer-
ence, creating undesirable puzzles, e.g. the ”price puzzle” where a contractionary monetary
policy is followed by a rise in price level instead of a fall (Sims, 1992). Leeper, Sims, and
Zha (1996) increased the number of variables by applying Bayesian inference, but their VAR
system still contains less than 20 variables.
In response to this limitation, the FAVAR model has been gaining in popularity espe-
cially in analyzing monetary transmission in a single country framework since Stock and
Watson (2005a) and Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005). In their works, just a couple of
unobservable factors represent over one hundred U.S. macroeconomic variables. The FAVAR
models can significantly reduce the degree of the omitted-variable bias that would be present
in the standard VAR model. Thus, the FAVAR model has much richer information than the
standard VAR model. Furthermore, many macroeconomic variables, such as gross domestic
product and price index, contain measurement errors. Since the unobservable factors in the
FAVAR model might be able to capture these errors, it also represents a solution to the
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measurement-error bias issue (Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz, 2005). With a panel FAVAR
model, Boivin, Giannoni, and Mojon (2008) examine the effect of the German monetary pol-
icy shocks on the other euro member countries in the context of a cross-country monetary
transmission analysis. Their main finding is that the introduction of the euro currency did
change the monetary transmission mechanism within the euro area and reduced the magni-
tude of the business cycles. However, their study employs euro common unobservable factors
only and does not consider country-specific unobservable factors.
The FAVAR approach has been adopted in the business cycles literature as well. Kose,
Otrok, and Whiteman (2008) utilize one common and one country-specific unobservable fac-
tors for each country. In their model, each country-specific factor depends on its own lags.
We extend this model by allowing multiple common factors and country-specific factors.
Later, we formally test to find out the optimized number of factors. We also let the country-
specific factors in our model depend on the lags of the other country’s country-specific factors
as well as their own lags, and therefore create interdependency among the G-7 economies.
This interdependency plays an important role in our cross-country monetary transmission
analysis and distinguishes it from all the other studies examining the same question. Since
interdependency refers to correlations among countries’ macroeconomic variables, it can gen-
erate business cycles comovements across countries. We also test whether the existence of
such interdependency is statistically significant.
The conventional view in international macroeconomics is that the degree of interdepen-
dency increases with high volumes of international trade and capital flows. For example,
international trade linkages lead to spillovers across countries in both demand and supply
sides. Through these spillover effects, stronger international trade linkages can lead to a
higher correlation in business cycles across countries. Financial linkages also can lead to a
similar result in the degree of interdependency. For example, after a positive productivity
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shock in the home country, foreign investors would benefit from capital gains in this country,
leading to the wealth effect in the foreign country as well. However, stronger trade link-
ages may also affect interdependency negatively. If stronger trade linkages are associated
with increased inter-industry specialization across countries, and industry-specific shocks are
dominant, then the degree of interdependency is expected to decrease (Frankel and Rose,
1998).
Paralleling with the theoretical arguments, empirical evidence is also ambiguous as to
global linkages affecting the international comovement of business cycles. Kalemli-Ozcan,
Sørensen, and Yosha (2003) show that trade linkages mitigate cross-country business cy-
cle comovements as they stimulate specialization of production. However several studies
support a positive relation between global linkages and international business cycles. Imbs
(2004a, 2004b) finds that the extent of financial linkages, sectoral similarity, and the volume
of intra-industry trade all have a positive impact on business cycle correlations. Baxter and
Kouparitsas (2005) and Otto, Voss, and Willard (2003) document that international trade
is the most important transmission channel in business cycles. The results by Kose, Prasad,
and Terrones (2007) provide evidence that both trade and financial linkages have a positive
impact on cross-country output correlations.
Empirical literature is unable to provide an unequivocal support for increased global in-
terdependency. Heathcote and Perri (2004) and Stock and Watson (2005b) find that the
correlation of business cycles between the United States and the other G-7 countries has
fallen in the second half of the last century. Using a much longer sample of annual data
(1880-2001), Bordo and Helbling (2003) document that the degree of interdependency across
industrialized countries has increased over time. Using the FAVAR model, Kose, Otrok, and
Whiteman (2008) find that the degree of comovement of business cycles across the G-7 coun-
tries has increased after 1986. Using data for 106 countries, Kose, Otrok, and Prasad (2012)
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find that business cycles have converged over time within industrial countries and within
emerging economies, but decoupled between these two groups of countries. They argue that
one of the reasons might be much higher levels of financial integration in industrial countries
than emerging economies.
A major component of output, and therefore possible contributor to international busi-
ness cycles, is the correlation of consumption across countries. Research has uncovered
what is now known as the ”consumption correlation puzzle”, which suggests that consump-
tion growth is less correlated than output growth, whereas it should be highly correlated
if business cycles are highly correlated. A promising explanation for this puzzle might be
international consumption risk sharing models developed by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland
(1992) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). The models show that, within a given country,
consumption growth should be less volatile than output growth, as risk sharing should allow
consumption smoothing in the face of output shocks. Initial empirical works testing of this
theory (e.g., Backus, Kehoe and Kydland, 1995, Lewis, 1996) find the degree of risk sharing
to be very low or even negative. Various extensions of this empirical work by Ambler et al.
(2003), Obstfeld (1994), Sørensen and Yosha (1998), and Stockman and Tesar (1995), have
largely confirmed the limited degree of risk sharing.
More recent literature has documented an increase in risk sharing since the 1990s. Artis
and Hoffmann (2006) and Sørensen et al. (2007) estimate that risk sharing among industrial
countries has increased steadily throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. A similar increase in
risk sharing is found in Kose et al. (2007), but they also show that this result does not hold
for emerging market economies. Giannone and Reichlin (2006) find an increase in risk shar-
ing within the euro area since the early 1990s. Sørensen et al. (2007) attribute it mainly to
the growing internationalization of portfolios due to a decline in home bias, in particular on




2.3.1 Class of Model
We allow our model to have multiple country-specific factors as well as multiple world-




i fi,t + λ
(y)yt + λ
(yi)
i yi,t + ei,t
Xi,t is observable variables, ft is world common unobservable factors at a time t, fi,t is
the ith country-specific unobservable factors at a time t, yt is common observable variables
at a time t, yi,t is the ith country-specific observable policy variables at a time t. λ
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We have to stress that there are no restrictions on the parameters φl to produce in-
terdependency among the world-common and country-specific unobservable factors. Now,
we turn to derive the first-order representation of Equations 2.1 and 2.2. Define Xt ≡
(X ′1,t, X
′
2,t, · · · , X
′
N,t)
′, Ft ≡ {f ′t , f
′
1,t, f2,t, · · · , f
′
N,t}
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and Ut ≡ {u′1,t, u
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2,t, · · · , u
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The error terms Et and Ut follow i.i.d. normal distributions N (0, Q) and N (0, R), re-
spectively. We define Xt ≡ (X ′t, Y
′
t )
′, λ ≡ (λf , λy), Et ≡ (e′t, O
′
Ny×1)




φ ≡ (φ1, φ2, · · · , φK)′, a K×PK matrix, we can further rewrite the preceding two equations
as:







We define Ft ≡ (ft, ft−1, · · · , ft−p+1), and Ut ≡ (ut, 0, 0, · · · , 0). Furthermore, we define
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and Λ ≡ (λ, 0, · · · , 0)′, N × pK matrix. Finally, we obtain the first-order representation
of FAVAR as follows:
Xt = ΛFt + Et, Et ∼ N (0,Q) (2.3)
Ft = ΦFt−1 + Ut, Ut ∼ N (0,R) (2.4)
We estimate the parameters θ ≡ {Λ, R, φ,Q} where φ = {φ1, φ2, · · · , φp} along with the
unobservable factors in FT ≡ {F1, · · · ,FT}.
69
2.3.2 Prior Distributions
We follow most of the FAVAR literature, such as Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005), and
Boivin, Giannoni, and Mojon (2008), and specify prior distributions as:
Qu ∼ IW(S0, ν0) (2.5)
vec(φ)| Qu ∼ N (φ0, Qu ⊗N
−1
0 ) (2.6)
In the nth equation, the prior is:
Rnn ∼ IG(δ0/2, η0/2) (2.7)




Using the prior distributions in Equation 2.5 to 2.8, we derive the posterior distributions in
this section.
(1) FT | XT , θ















FT | XT , θ ∼ N(FT |T , ST |T )
Ft|T | Ft+1|T ,X
T , θ ∼ N(Ft|t,Ft+1|T , St|t,Ft+1|T )
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Kalman filter:








Ft|t = Ft|t−1 + St|t−1Λ
′H−1t|t−1ηt|t−1
St|t = St|t−1 − St|t−1Λ
′H−1t|t−1ΛSt|t−1





















F∗t|t,Ft+1|T = Ft|t + St|tΦ
∗′J−1t+1|tξt+1|t
S∗t|t,Ft+1|T = St|t − St|tΦ
∗′J−1t+1|tΦ
∗St|t
where ξt+1|t = F
∗
t −Φ
∗Ft|t and Jt+1|t = Φ
∗St|tΦ
∗′ +Q∗. Q∗ is an upper K ×K of Q, Φ∗ is the
first K rows of Φ, and F∗t is the first K rows of Ft
(2) λ,R| XT ,FT , φ,Q
Rnn| X
T ,FT ∼ IG(δn/2, ηn/2) (2.10)
Λn| X





ηn = η0 + T




n + (Λ̂n − Λn,0)
′[M−1n,0 + (F
n′Fn)−1]−1(Λ̂n − Λn,0)








and Fn is the regressors of the nth equation, Λ̂n is the equation-by-equation OLS estimator,
and êcn is its residuals.
(3) vec(φ),Q| XT ,FT , λ,R
Qu| X
T ,FT ∼ IW(ST , νT ) (2.12)




νT = ν0 + T
ST = ν
−1
















This paper employs the sign restriction of Uhlig (2005). For FAVAR model, Ahmad and
Uhlig (2009) examines the sign restrictions, compared with a standard Cholesky decomposi-
tion. They found that their sign restriction approach outperforms the competing Cholesky
identification, and they argued that it is robust across different subsamples and monetary
regimes avoiding anomalies present in Cholesky identification, such as the price puzzle de-
scribed in Section 2. In this paper’s analysis, since it is almost impossible to rank the
country-specific factors among the G-7 countries, it is not reasonable to use Cholesky in
Equation 2.4. There is simply no reasonable explanation for which country-specific factors




The sample period is 1985Q1:2010Q4. We show the description of data in Appendix A. In
order to ensure stationarity, the data transformations, such as level, difference, logarithmic,
percentage change, or difference in percentage change, are made in the exact same fashion
as Stock and Watson (2005a), and Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005). See more details
in Appendix A. All data are obtained from IMF International Financial Statistics. Both
nominal and real exchange rates are effective (which are weighted by trade volumes), and an
increase in the exchange rate represents a home currency appreciation. We use oil price for
a common observable variable (yt), and Federal funds rate and overnight call rate for each
country’s policy variable (yi,t).
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2.5 Posterior Simulation
We estimate the posterior moments of the parameters in the model in (1), using the Gibbs
sampler as a posterior simulation described in Section 3.3. In this simulation, each draw is
iterated 24,000 times and the first 4,000 iterations are burned in. Then, we choose a thinning
parameter of 2 so that only every second draw was kept after the burn-in in order to reduce
potential autocorrelation of the sequence in the Gibbs sampler. For the parameters in the
prior distributions, we set S0 = O, ν0 = 0, φ0 = 0, N0 = O, δ0 = 6, η0 = 10
−3, Λn = O, and
Mn,0 = I. Note that the choices of S0 and ν0 can be arbitrary as they are cancelled out in
the posterior.
2.6 Statistical Inference
In this section, we present the impulse response functions of our panel FAVAR model with
interdependency among the G-7 countries. We show the estimated common unobservable
factors and country-specific ones in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. We choose one common factor and
three country-specific factors for each country. Later, we show that these numbers of factors
provide the best fit to our model. We present the impulse response functions in Figures 2.3
to 2.9. We normalize the contractionary U.S. monetary shock to a 10-basis-point innovation
in the Federal funds rate.
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Note: The units are all annualized percentage changes expect for the interest rates. The
unit of the interest rates are percentage points.
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2.6.1 Impulse Response Functions
We begin with the responses of U.S. macroeconomic variables in Figure 2.3. After the con-
tractionary U.S. monetary policy shock, both output and consumption fall by 0.13% and
0.22%, respectively. The immediate effect in investment is ambiguous. Both nominal and
real effective exchange rates initially rise (a home currency appreciation), and then fall (a
home currency depreciation) after one to two quarters. This is in line with the overshooting
of Dornbusch (1976) although he refers to bi-lateral exchange rates. Export falls more than
import does. Overall, net export improves by 0.30% one quarter after the shock.
According to Figures 2.4 to 2.9, the contractionary monetary policy in the U.S. is trans-
mitted to falls in the outputs of the other G-7 countries: a fall of 0.20% for Japan, 0.09%
for Germany, 0.14% for U.K., 0.10% for France, 0.09% for Italy, and 0.17% for Canada,
although the immediate effect on Germany’s output is not statistically significant. These
results show that Japan’s real economy is most affected by the U.S. monetary policy, fol-
lowed by the UK and Canada that are the Anglo-Saxon countries. The similarity in the
movement of macroeconomic variables among the U.S., the UK, and Canada is reported in
some literature, and called the Anglo-Saxon effect. Our model’s results are consistent with
this effect. The continental Europe’s real economy is also affected by this policy shock. Yet,
its magnitudes are the least among the G-7 countries.
It is a similar story in the responses of their consumptions. The drops in these countries’
consumptions are: 0.17% for Japan, 0.09% for the UK, 0.09% for France, 0.07% for Italy,
while ambiguous for Germany. An important thing we would like to emphasize is that, for
these countries, excluding the U.S., their consumptions falls less than their outputs. This
result is consistent with international risk sharing documented in many existing literature.
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2.6.2 Robustness Check
In checking the robustness of the model, we test whether the numbers of the common and
country-specific unobservable factors are optimized in terms of the marginal density of data
(MDD). Using MDD is a common practice to find an optimized number of unobservable
states in Markov switching literature such as Sims and Zha (2006). However, to our best
knowledge, none of the Bayesian FAVAR literature concerning monetary transmission mech-
anism uses MDD to optimize the number of unobservable factors.
Since there exists no analytical solution of MDD in this model, we apply the approxi-
mation method of Chib (1997) to our analysis. See more details in Appendix B. We reports
MDDs in Table 2.1. The results show that the model with one common factor and three
country-specific factors has the highest MDD -100129, indicating that it is the best model.
Although their model is non-panel, Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005) choose four factors
for the U.S. This paper officially tests the number of factors, and obtains one for the common
factor and three for the country-specific ones, thus four total factors for each G-7 country.
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Table 2.1: Optimal Numbers of Unobservable Factors
The Number of The Number of Marginal Density













* denotes a best model.
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2.6.3 Role of Interdependency
In this section, we examine whether interdependency among the country-specific factors in
our model is statistically significant. As in the preceding section, we use MDD. We conduct
a test to impose the restriction on parameter Φ in Equation 2.4. More specifically, to test the
restriction of no interdependency, we set zeros in Φ corresponding to the coefficients of the
lags of the other country’s country-specific factors. Thus, our model reduces to the model
of Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman (2008). We use the optimized number of factors found in
the preceding section, i.e., one common factor and three country-specific factors. We report
MDDs in Table 2.2. The results show that the model with interdependency has the MDD of
-100129 while the one without interdependency has -343210. This indicates that the model
with interdependency is a better model than the one without it. Thus, we conclude that
interdependency among country-specific factors plays a significant role in our cross-country
monetary analysis mechanism among the G-7 economies.
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Table 2.2: Interdependency Test
Marginal Density
Restriction of Data
Model with Interdependency -100129∗
Model without Interdependency -343210
* denotes a best model.
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Using the model without interdependency, we also present the responses of U.S. macroe-
conomic variables in Figure 2.10. Compared with the model with interdependency in Figure
2.3, we can see some clear distinctions. The initial shocks to U.S. output and consumption
are less by .07 and .06 percentage points respectively in the model with interdependency
than in without it. This result implies that the existence of our model’s interdependency
mitigates the effect of U.S. monetary policy shock on U.S. real economy. Thus, this evidence
suggests that most of the VAR or FAVAR literature concerning U.S. monetary transmission
mechanism that do not use other countries’ variables, might overstate the effect on the real
economy. This view is consistent with the argument of Sims and Zha (2006) among many
others, that the effect of monetary policy on the real economy might be very little.
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Note: The units are all annualized percentage changes expect for the interest rates. The
unit of the interest rates are percentage points.
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2.6.4 Euro Effect
In this section, we briefly examine whether the introduction of euro currency after 1999
changes our results. We present the impulse responses of G-7 macroeconomic variables
using the subsample beginning 1999Q1 in Figures 2.11 to 2.17. Although this sample period
might be relatively short for this analysis, we see no clear difference between our full sample
beginning 1985Q1 and this euro period. However, there is a marginal difference in response
of outputs and investments in the euro area, Germany France, and Italy. This might suggest
that the introduction of a common currency in this area contributes to the reduction in
their business cycles due to the U.S. monetary shock as some literature suggest, e.g., Boivin,
Giannoni, and Mojon (2008). However, our results show the differences are marginal, and
we leave further researches outside the scope of this paper. Our main point here is that the
introduction of euro currency does not critically affect this paper’s results.
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2.7 2-country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model
In this section, we examine a 2-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model compared with our panel-FAVAR model. We extend the model of Ferrero, Gertler, and
Svensson (2008) (FGS08 henceforth) by allowing habit formation in consumption dynamics
so that its responses to shocks shape smoother as in many DSGE studies. Unlike their model,
we assume that the foreign country’s monetary policy also responds to the changes in the
exchange rate and the home country’s interest rate, while home country’s (U.S.) monetary
policy responds only to its own inflation and output as in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998).
This monetary policy would be reasonable for non-U.S. G-7 countries because those countries’




Aggregate consumption (Ct) consists of tradable-good consumption (CT,t) and non-tradable-







Furthermore, tradable-good consumption consists of home-made-good consumption (CH,t)















































θt = βtθt−1 (2.17)
βt =
eςt
1 + ψ(logCt − ϑ)
(2.18)
We allow the discount factor θt to be time-varying, and its time-varying coefficient βt depends
on the preference shock (ςt) and the long-run level of consumption (Ct). The parameter ω
is the degree of internal habit persistence, 1/σ corresponds to the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in the absence of habit formation, and 1/ϕ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.







The price index of tradable goods is:
PT,t =
[
































Household’s budget constraint is:







where Bt is a government bond holding at the end of a time t, It is nominal interest rate at
the end of a time t, Lk,t(f) is labor supply function in firm f in the tradable good sector
(k = H) and in the non-tradable good sector (k = N), and Wk,t(f) is nominal wage in
firm f for k = H , N . Υt is dividends. Within the household, a fraction γ of workers
work in the tradable goods sector, while a fraction 1 − γ work in the nontradable goods









where Λt is the household’s marginal utility of additional nominal income at a time t. Also,








for k = H,N . We defines nominal exchange rate as et ≡ Pk,t/P
∗
k,t for k = H , N . The
superscript ∗ denotes its foreign counterpart. As in FGS08, we assume that the foreign
country bond is not traded internationally. Thus, while home citizens trade only in domestic
bonds, foreign citizens may hold either domestic or foreign country bonds. Finally, we obtain

























(2-1) Final Good Firms



































































(2-2) Intermediate Good Firms
For k = H , N , monopolistic competitive firm f produces intermediate goods by the following
production function:





= 1 + g (2.37)
where At is the total factor productivity, at is the technology shock, and Zt is the long-run
trend of total factor productivity which grows at the rate of g. For each firm f , the marginal





Intermediate good firms set price in the manner of Calvo-type sticky price in which only a






where Λt,t+s = βt+s(Ct+s/Ct)
−1(Pt/Pt+s). The first order condition for the optimal reset








kt(f)− (1 + µ)MCk,t+s(f)]Yk,t+s
}
= 0 (2.40)
where µ ≡ (σ − 1)−1. Finally, the price index in each sector evolves according to:
Pkt = [ξP
1−σ








As in FGS08, we add imperfect pass-through following Monacelli (2005). We introduce
monopolistically competitive retailers who import foreign tradables and sell them to domestic
residents. The law of one price may not hold because local retailers set the price of imported
goods in a staggered fashion. Each period, a fraction ξ̃ of retailers hold their price constant
while the remaining fraction 1 − ξ̃ solve an optimal problem. In particular, these retailers






















where µ̃ ≡ (η − 1)−1. The law of large numbers implies that the price index for imported
goods becomes:
PF,t = ξ̃PF,t−1 + (1− ξ̃)P
o
F,t (2.44)







In case of perfect pass-through, ΨF,t = 1.
(3) Current Account Dynamics
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We assume that the home central bank sets its nominal interest rate according to the fol-
lowing monetary policy rule:
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ)(φπEtπt+1 + φyyt) + ǫt (2.49)
where it ≡ log(It/I) corresponds to the deviations of the interest rate from its steady-
state value (I), πt ≡ log(Pt/Pt−1) denotes deviations of CPI inflation around the steady
state (assumed to be zero), yt represents percent deviations of output from trend, ∆et =
log(Et/Et+1) denotes percent nominal depreciation of the home currency, and the iid shock ǫt
measures unexpected interest-rate disturbances. The foreign central bank follows a similar
rule, but also responds to a change in the exchange rate and a change in the home country’s
nominal interest rate as follows:
i∗t = ρ
















For both home and foreign tradables, production must equal demand:
YH,t = CH,t + C
∗
H,t




Y ∗N,t = C
∗
N,t
International financial markets must clear:
Bt +B
∗
t = 0 (2.51)
where B∗t represents the nominal holdings of the domestic bond by the foreign household.
2.7.2 Calibrations
We follow FGS08 for most of our calibrations. The steady-state growth rate of the economy
g is set to 0.5%, so that annual growth is 2%. The steady-state discount factor β is set
to 0.99. The parameters describing the evolution of the discount factor ϑ = −1000 and
ψ = 7.2361 × 10−6. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply is ϕ−1 = 0.5. The elasticity of
substitution among intermediate goods θ = 11 results in a steady-state markup of 10% in
the tradable and nontradable sectors. We set the probability that intermediate-goods firms
and importing retailers do not re-optimize their price to ξ = ξ̃ = 0.66, corresponding to a
mean duration between price re-optimizations of 3 quarters. For the parameters that de-
termine the openness of the economies, we set the share of tradables in the consumption
basket to γ = 0.7, the preference share for home tradables α = 0.5, and the elasticity of
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substitution between home and foreign tradables η = 2. As a departure from FGS08, we
calibrate ω = 0.60 assuming that there is some degree of habit formation in consumption.
For the parameters in monetary policy rule, ρ = ρ∗ = 0.75, φπ = φ
∗
π = 2.00, , φy = φ
∗
y = 0.30,




We present the responses of key variables to the home country’s monetary shock in Figure
18. The solid lines are for home country variables and the break lines are for foreign country
ones. There are a couple of notable results compared with our panel FAVAR model. First,
consumption falls less than own output in both countries. Although the difference between
output and consumption is very small, this simple 2-country DSGE model also shows evi-
dence of international consumption risk sharing. Notice that there is no explicit capital in
this model, and consumption includes investment. Thus, even including investment, a fall in
consumption is still slightly less than a fall in output. This suggests that there is a possibility
of international risk sharing. Second, the home currency initially appreciates (overshooting),
and then depreciates with the presence of imperfect pass through. Note that this exchange
rate in the 2-country DSGE is a bilateral one, instead of an effective one. Third, net export
improves in the home country.
Next, we change the monetary policy rule in the foreign country to see whether it changes
the effect of contractionary monetary shock in the home country. Especially, the foreign cen-
tral bank reacts in the same way as the home central bank. In other words, it doesn’t react
to the change in home monetary policy nor the exchange rate, i.e., φ∗i = 0 and φ
∗
e = 0. We
represent the impulse response functions of key variables in Figure 19. This result is very
different from the previous result in Figure 18. In the foreign country, both output and
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consumption are not affected significantly compared with the previous result. Although this
model has only 2 countries, the result suggests that the comovement of outputs in both home
and foreign countries might be generated as a result of the foreign central bank’s reacting to
the change in home monetary policy and the exchange rate.
109








































































































 0  4  8  12  16
Real Exchange Rate
Note: Solid lines are home country and break lines are foreign country.
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Note: Solid lines are home country and break lines are foreign country.
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2.8 Conclusion
In this paper, we explored a cross-country monetary transmission mechanism. Particularly,
we examined the effect of the U.S. monetary policy shock on the G-7 economies. To facilitate
our analysis, we developed the panel FAVAR model. Unlike existing literature, we allowed
interdependency among the country-specific factors in our model in order to produce the
comovement of business cycles in the G-7 countries. Such comovement is documented else-
where in international macroeconomic literature.
Our findings are that: (1) The model with such interdependency is superior to the one
without it. This interdependency plays an important role in our cross-country monetary
transmission mechanism. (2) Such international dependency reduces the magnitude of the
U.S. business cycle. This suggests that most of the VAR or FAVAR literature of the U.S.
monetary transmission that do not use other countries’ variables, overstate the effect on the
U.S. real economy. This view is consistent with the argument of Sims and Zha (2006) among
many others that the effect of monetary policy on real economy might be very little. (3)
As a result of interdependency, the effect on other G-7 countries’ real economy is similar,
although there are differences in magnitude. For example, after the U.S. contractionary
monetary shock, Japan’s output is affected most, followed by the Anglo-Saxon countries,
the UK and Canada, and then followed by the continental European countries, Germany,
France, and Italy. (4) The consumption in each country falls less than its output. This
is evidence of international consumption risk sharing documented in many literature. (5)
Our 2-country DSGE model shows the evidence of such risk sharing, and also suggests that
the comovement of business cycles among countries might be caused by the foreign central
bank’s reacting to the change in home monetary policy and the exchange rate.
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3 Fiscal Sustainability and Fiscal Policy Reaction to Debt Accumulation in the
U.S.: A Time-varying Coefficient Approach
3.1 Introduction
The sustainability of government’s fiscal stance has been at the heart of the financial insta-
bility in the global financial crisis in 2007-2008. This recurrent concern of the government
debt has also been a subject of active debate in academic research since the debt crises of
the mid-1980s, and is still ongoing debate today. The issues range from sustainability of
the government debt, government’s fiscal discipline, to effectiveness of fiscal policy, and also
from the short run to the long run. The analysis of government’s fiscal solvency can be con-
ducted from a long-run perspective by examining the budget’s and/or debt’s mean reversion
properties or in terms of fiscal disciplines. Recently, emphasis has shifted to the latter. The
broadly adopted approach, called Bohn criterion (1998, 2008), analyzes whether or not the
government reacts to excessive debt accumulation after controlling for the long-run devia-
tions of output and government spending. If the government generates a primary surplus
(a surplus in its revenues minus expenses, excluding debt services) in response to a rise in
public debt, then the budget is deemed to be solvent. Accordingly, a positive coefficient is a
sufficient condition for the sustainability of fiscal policy.
As far as the effect of fiscal policy is concerned, economic theories provide no decisive an-
swers for it. These theories crucially differs in their assumptions to each other. For example,
is it based on microeconomic foundation? Is the characteristics of the economy a ”Neo-
classical” or ”Keynesian” economy? Is it ”Ricardian” or ”non-Ricardian”? Is it a closed
113
or an open economy? Modern dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models have different
implications than standard Keynesian theory. Answers differ not only with respect to the
size of the effect but also in some cases with respect to the direction of the effect. The the-
oretical debate seems not to reach a consensus due to a lack of persuasive empirical evidence.
The literature examining the fiscal policy reaction incorporating nonlinearities, as well
as panel and long-term data. However, whether the analysis is set in a panel, which gives a
group average, or time series, which provides an average over the sample period, the exist-
ing studies do not provide information for a given country’s true fiscal stance. It would be
easy to see that the reaction of the government, if it exists, depends on a myriad of factors,
such as political ones as well as economic ones. The existing models, which rely on fixed
coefficients, are unable to capture the changes that occur in the fiscal stance of a country
over time. Modeling nonlinearities is a move in the right direction but insufficient to give a
general picture of the way how the government handles its fiscal policy, and how it is affected
by various shocks to the economy. Moreover, each variable entering the reaction of fiscal
policy function is likely to be endogenous, and affects each other. Thus, estimating a single
equation without controlling for endogeneities is likely to bias results.
In this study, we conduct an empirical analysis to examine a fiscal policy reaction function
by remedying both problems. We take into account endogeneities by casting the analysis in
a multivariate framework, and allow our reaction function to vary over time using a time-
varying-coefficient vector autoregressive (VAR) model. Along with it, we also incorporate
stochastic volatility in our model. We use the U.S. data to examine the sustainability of the
fiscal policies not only because of the high quality of data, but also because of the fact that
a substantial share of the studies uses a similar set of data, which allows comparison of our
results with the existing findings.
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Our findings are: (1) the response of the government’s primary surplus to a 1 percent debt
shock displays first a deterioration of the primary balance in 1981Q1-1991Q4 and 2001Q1-
2008Q1. (2) However, there are the periods when there is a sustained improvement from the
beginning without any deteriorations of the primary balance, that are in 1992Q1-2000Q4
and 2008Q2-2013Q1. (3) These differences in the fiscal policy reactions might be due to re-
cessions and wars. (4) The effect on output gap becomes more negative during the resession
along with no immediate reaction in fiscal policy to reduce the level of debt in response to
an exogenous debt shock. (5) Our robustness test shows that our time-varying coefficient
model with stochastic volatility is superior to a standard VAR model in terms of marginal
density of data.
3.2 Stylized Facts
The government budget equation indicates that a passive policy would lead to causality
running from surplus to deficit. The government would give a systematic primary deficit,
which is financed by raising debt. A fiscally responsible government counteracts debt by
generating a primary surplus when public indebtedness reaches a critical level. In reality,
the government can do both over the course of a few decades, and even over a single election
cycle. Moreover, during recessions, we can observe spurious co-movements of deficit and
debt because a large output gap may increase the deficit.
Figure 3.1 depicts the fluctuations in the U.S. primary-balance-to-GDP ratio and the
U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio, and Figure 3.2 does the U.S. output gap since 1980. At first blush,
each series appears to be a mirror image to each other. A worsening of primary balances, ex-
acerbated by tax cuts (1982, 2001, 2002, and 2003), and the three recessions, is accompanied
by rising debt ratios in 1980-86, 2001-2004 and 2007-2009; an improving primary balances is
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met by declining or stabilizing debt in 1986-88, 1992-2001. However, a closer scrutiny shows
many exceptions in the data. Examples are the periods the early 1990s, the second half of
2000, and more recently, since 2010. A glance at Figure 3.1 and 3.2 also suggests a rough
correlation between the primary balance and the output gap.
These stylized facts thus indicate that the relation between the primary balance and debt
is complex and changes over time, making it difficult to isolate a time-varying systematic
policy from discretionary policies and automatic stabilizers. Any analysis of government
behavior has to take into account these considerations.
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Figure 3.1: Primary Balance and Debt
Note: The solid line is the primary balance to GDP ratio, and the break line is the public
debt to GDP ratio. The gray areas express the periods of recessions announced by National
Bureau of Economic Research.
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Figure 3.2: Output Gap
Note: The output gap is expressed by the GDP ratio. The gray areas express the periods
of recessions announced by National Bureau of Economic Research.
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3.3 Literature Review
In examining the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy one crucial assumption of any
model is whether or not agents are forward looking. In the absence of micro-founded for-
ward looking behavior, expected future changes have no effects on current period decisions
whereas forward-looking consumers, armed with rational expectations, do react in the cur-
rent period to expected changes in future variables. The following two subsections provide
an overview of theoretical predictions distinguishing between models with and without a
micro-founded forward-looking behavior.
3.3.1 Theories without micro-founded forward-looking behavior
In the Classical model in which prices are fully flexible and the supply curve is vertical, there
is no role for fiscal policy. In the other boundary world, the Keynesian model, illustrated
by the undergraduate IS-LM and Mundell-Fleming analyses, prices are sticky and current
consumption depends on current income with no role for expected future income. In this
world, an expansionary fiscal policy can stimulate the real economy with multiplier effects.
The mechanism by which these effects occur depends on the degree of openness and the
embraced exchange rate regime of the economy.
In a closed economy, for a given money supply, an increase in government spending
stimulates economic activity increasing output. Since money demand depends on income,
the increase
In a small open economy with a flexible exchange rate regime, a fiscal expansion puts
upward pressure on the interest rate. If capital is perfectly mobile and the interest rate is
fixed at the world level, capital flows into the economy increasing the demand for the domes-
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tic currency. As a result, the nominal exchange rate appreciates. Because prices are sticky,
the nominal appreciation is mapped to a real exchange rate appreciation. Consequently, net
exports decline. This negative effect on the trade balance offsets the expansionary effect of
fiscal policy. Thus, according to this setting, fiscal policy in small open economies with a
flexible exchange rate regime is ineffective. While a small open economy cannot affect the
rest of the world, the case of a large open economy lies between the two polar cases of a
closed and a small open economy. In an open economy with a fixed exchange rate regime,
fiscal expansion puts upward pressure on the exchange rate and interest rate. Money supply
increases to defend the fixed exchange rate parity. The final effect is an increase in output.
Hence, fiscal policy under this scenario is effective in stimulating output.
In an integrated world, domestic fiscal policy can affect foreign economies, particularly
in the case of a currency union; i.e. a multi-country Mundell-Fleming model with a fixed ex-
change rate regime. Fiscal policy externalities may arise in opposite directions. The increase
in domestic output will lead to additional imports from trading partners boosting the income
of the trading partners (trade channel). At the same time, the initial upward pressure on
the domestic interest rate attracts foreign capital including capital from other members of
the currency union. Hence, members’ interest rates are under upward pressure. As a result,
the union-wide interest rate may rise. This in turns has a contractionary effect on output
(interest rate channel). Additionally, the exchange rate of the union currency is floating
with the rest of the world. If the fiscal expansion in a (large) member economy causes an
appreciation to the real exchange rate with the rest of the world, as the Mundell-Flemming
model predicts, the expansionary effects will be dampened due to worsening trade balance.
Yet, the theoretical reasoning assumes that one country implements a fiscal stimulus plan,
possibly in response to a country-specific negative shock, while ignoring the policy of the
rest of the world. In an environment of an international economic downturn (a common
global shock), one might argue in favour of a collective fiscal effort. As mentioned above,
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the effects of fiscal stimuli in highly open economies can be retarded by the appreciation of
the real exchange rate and the deterioration of the trade balance. Coordinated fiscal actions
among trading partners can reduce the bill of the country-specific fiscal stimulus and elimi-
nate free-riding possibilities.
3.3.2 Theories with micro-founded forward looking behavior
The analysis presented in the previous section is not based on micro-founded behaviors.
Macroeconomic theory is increasingly building on Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) models to derive micro-founded intertemporal aggregate relations that explain the
factors behind economic fluctuations. Typically, DSGE models incorporate forward look-
ing agents and rational expectations. The modelling strategy is as follows: All agents in
the model follow optimal plans. Consumers maximize lifetime expected utility subject to
the budget constraint. Firms maximize profits subject to the available technology, and the
government has to satisfy the government budget constraint. To solve the model, usually,
the resulting optimisation conditions together with the equilibrium conditions are linearized
around the steady state (perturbation). The final solution of the model can be summarized
by a set of linear equations. The economy in these models is subject to stochastic distur-
bances, which are shocks. A disturbance to a fiscal variable, government spending or taxes,
is a fiscal shock. In order to study the dynamics of the variables following a shock, the
model’s parameters are calibrated and/or estimated. Calibration means assigning values for
the parameters based on microeconometric evidence or theoretical justifications.
Two important assumptions distinguish between two types of DSGE models: The Real
Business Cycle (RBC) model in which prices are flexible and perfect competition prevails in
all markets and the New Keynesian (NK) models with sticky prices and imperfect competi-
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tion. The following two subsections survey the role of fiscal policy in both types of models.
The setup and solution techniques of DSGE models can be found in details in DeJong and
Dave (2007), Gali (2008), McCandless (2008) and Woodford (2003).
3.3.3 Fiscal policy in Real Business Cycle models
RBC models primarily focus on the role of real shocks, such as technology and preferences
shocks, in explaining economic fluctuations. Rebelo (2005) presents an overview of RBC
models. The analysis of fiscal policy in a RBC setup can be found for examples in Bax-
ter and King (1993), Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992), Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) and Ohanian (1997).
In a prototypical RBC model, government spending is financed by lump-sum taxes. The
forward-looking consumer understands that additional government purchases in the current
period have to be financed by taxes in the future. Therefore, an increase in government
spending reduces the household wealth by increasing the present value of household tax
liabilities (negative wealth effect). As a result, consumption declines while interest rate,
saving and labour supply increase. The rise in hours worked in turn causes real wages to
fall whereas investment and output increase. This described fiscal policy transmission is in
force whether the rise in government spending is permanent or persistent but not permanent;
Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004). The intuition behind the increase in investment
is that the higher steady state level of hours worked requires initially higher investment to
build up additional capital stock; Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999). If the increase
in government spending is very temporarily, investment goes down to smooth consumption.
The response of private consumption to the increase in government spending is inde-
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pendent of the financing tool. Permanent income is the same with a tax-financed or a
debt-financed expansion; i.e. Ricardian equivalence holds. Burnside et al. (2004) show that
the effects of distortionary taxes are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the effects
of lump-sum taxes except for some differences concerning the timing of the peak response.
Further, in a modified version of the model, Burnside et al. (2004) introduce investment
adjustment costs and habit persistence in private consumption. This modified version of
the model mutes, but not completely, the negative effect of the shock on consumption and
generates a hump shaped response for investment.
The classical open economy treatment of RBC models by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland
(1994) focuses on the dynamics of the terms-of-trade and the trade balance following a
technology shock. Other studies are mainly concerned with the implied properties of the in-
ternational business cycle and correlation patterns between key variables. A very small role
of fiscal shocks in explaining output volatility in a small open economy. Thus, in contrast
to the Keynesian prediction, RBC models predict a negative effect of fiscal expansion on
consumption, albeit a positive effect on output.
3.3.4 Fiscal policy in Neo-Keynesian models
The Neo-Keynesian DSGE framework adopts the RBC modelling strategy of deriving micro-
founded aggregate relations, but fundamentally differs in assuming monopolistic competition
and nominal rigidities. A particular interest of this class of models is the study of monetary
policy; Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003).
Analysing fiscal policy in a standard DSGE model generally gives similar predictions to
those of a prototypical RBC model: an increase in output and a decrease in consumption;
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Linnemann and Schabert (2003). This is due to the negative wealth effect of a fiscal ex-
pansion resulting from the embedded forward looking behavior of households in both types
of models. The labour market reacts differently, though. As stressed by Pappa (2009), in
contrast to the RBC prediction, real wages in a Neo-Keynesianmodel increase after a positive
shock to government consumption. This is because the resulting increase in output raises
the demand for labour which in a Neo-Keynesian setup offsets the increase in the labour
supply due to the negative wealth effect.
Many DSGE models do not include capital (short-run models), and therefore refrain
from fully modelling private investment decisions. In models with capital accumulation, an
increase in government spending raises the interest rate and crowds out private investment.
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2009) show that when the zero bound of the nominal
interest rate is strictly binding, the positive effect of an increase in government spending on
output raises expected inflation. This in turn causes a decline in the real interest rate. In
such economy, the government spending multiplier is relatively large.
Thus, in its simplest form, a NK DSGE model misses the Keynesian prediction of a pos-
itive effect of a fiscal expansion on consumption. Furthermore, Monacelli and Perotti (2010)
show that an increase in government spending in a standard open economy DSGE model
typically causes an appreciation of the real exchange rate and worsens the trade balance. As
it is revealed in the next section however, there are empirical studies that report a positive
impact on consumption coupled with a depreciation of the real exchange rate. Hence, many
studies are apt to modify prototypical DSGE models particularly due to the responses of
consumption and the real exchange rate. As regards fiscal policy externalities in a DSGE
setup, Corsetti, Meier and Muller (2010) show in a two-country DSGE model that financing
a fiscal expansion with a combination of an increase in taxes and a decrease in government
spending in the medium-run enhances positive cross-border fiscal spillovers.
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3.3.5 The consumption controversy
Broadly, there are four main modifications to DSGE models in order to get the Neo-
Keynesian predictions in line with the Keynesian, and the RBC predictions in line with
influential econometric evidence; that is generating a positive response of consumption. First,
some models adopt a non-separable utility function in consumption and leisure. Linnemann
(2006) applies this strategy in a RBC setup. This specification of preferences implies that
consumption and leisure are substitutes. The negative wealth effect of the fiscal expansion
raises hours worked, which decreases leisure. Consequently, the marginal utility of consump-
tion increases. The household wants to work more and to consume more mitigating the
negative wealth effect. As a result, in this model consumption, employment and output
increase. However, as emphasized by Bilbiie (2009), the non-separable utility specification
has the drawback that consumption increases only if it is an inferior good.
A second method of generating a positive effect on consumption is to introduce habit per-
sistence in consumption at the good level (so-called ”deep habits”); Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2006). Although this model does not include nominal rigidities, it departs from
the standard RBC model by assuming monopolistic competition in goods markets. In this
model, the mark-up of price over the marginal cost inversely depends on the price elasticity
of demand, which is in the presence of deep habits related to aggregate demand. The spend-
ing shock stimulates aggregate demand and labour supply. Firms reduce the mark-ups and
increase labour demand. The increase in labour demand over-offsets the increase in labour
supply. Real wages rise. The value of leisure in terms of consumption declines. The final
effect is an increase in output and consumption. Time variant mark-ups are the driving
engine of the positive effect on consumption in the presence of deep habits.
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In a standard DSGE model, mark-ups are time invariant. Closely linked to the contribu-
tion of Ravn et al. (2006) is the study by Bouakez and Rebei (2007) who allow households’
preferences in a RBC model to exhibit habit persistence in consumption and to depend on
government spending. In this model, the marginal utility of consumption increases after a
government spending shock because private and public spending are complements.
Third, some DSGE models include two types of households: Ricardian households and
non-Ricardian households who consume all of their current income; Coenen and Straub
(2005) and Gali, Valles and Lopez-Salido (2007). This idea traces back to Campbell and
Mankiw (1989) and Mankiw (2000). A non-Ricardian consumer can be deemed of as either
a consumer who faces a binding borrowing constraint or an irrational consumer. In these
models, the increase in real wages resulting from the positive shock to government spending
leads the non-Ricardian households to increase their consumption. Depending on the share
of the non-Ricardian households in total households, the effect on aggregate consumption
can be positive. For instance, Coenen and Straub (2005) and Forni, Monteforte and Sessa
(2009) estimate this share in the Euro Area to be lower than 25 percent and between 30 and
40 percent, respectively. Campbell and Mankiw (1989) find that half of income in the US
goes to rule-of-thumb consumers.
Fourth, as argued by Corsetti, Meier and Muller (2009) an increase in current govern-
ment spending may not only lead to an increase in future taxes but also to a decrease in
future government spending (spending reversals). This spending reversal effect is modelled
by allowing the dynamics of government spending to respond to the stock of public debt.
Additionally, Corsetti et al. (2009) allow for non-Ricardian consumers. In this model, a fis-
cal shock coupled with anticipated spending reversal in a sticky price world increases output
and consumption.
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3.3.6 The real exchange rate controversy
In contrast to the findings of some econometric studies, Keynesian and DSGE models predict
an appreciation of the real exchange rate following the fiscal expansion. A theoretical model
that predicts the opposite is Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). In their two-country intertem-
poral model, the standard negative wealth effect on consumption does hold. As a result,
an increase in government spending decreases the relative demand for domestic money and
raises domestic prices. The purchasing power parity implies a depreciation of the nominal
exchange rate.
Monacelli and Perotti (2010) however argue, based on econometric evidence, that the
depreciation of the exchange rate must be associated with an increase and not a decrease
in consumption. This result can be achieved by adopting non-separable preferences or the
deep habit persistence (time variant mark-ups). Ravn et al. (2007) show in a model of deep
habits that an anticipated government spending shock, on impact, decreases consumption
and causes an appreciation of the real exchange rate, as in standard DSGE models, whereas
an unanticipated government spending shock increases consumption and causes a deprecia-
tion of the real exchange rate.
Monacelli and Perotti (2010) point out that the behavior of non-Ricardian consumers
does not determine the real exchange rate. Therefore, the inclusion of non-Ricardian con-
sumers per se, although it generates a positive effect on consumption, does not generate a
depreciation of the real exchange rate. In the spending reversal model of Corsetti, Meier
and Muller (2009), the real exchange rate does depreciate while consumption increases after
a fiscal expansion.
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Concerning other indicators of relative prices, Muller (2008) shows that in the presence
of home bias in private and government consumption a government spending shock leads to
an appreciation in the terms-of-trade (the relative price of imports). Additionally, net ex-
ports will increase if some elasticity conditions hold. In principle, home bias in consumption
is the assumption behind the change in relative prices. Without a home bias, a change in
consumption will not change relative prices and the terms-of-trade.
Further, Monacelli and Perotti (2008) examine the response of the relative price of non-
traded goods. Intuitively, if government consumption is more intensive in services (i.e. inten-
sive in non-traded goods) than private consumption is, an increase in government spending
leads to an appreciation of the price of non-traded goods. Monacelli and Perotti (2008) show
that the openness of the economy to international trade implies an increase in the price of
non-traded goods after a government spending shock even if government spending is not
more intensive in non-traded goods than private consumption is.
The link between the budget balance and the current account, ultimately based on the
national account identity, is frequently cited as the twin deficit hypothesis according to which
an increase in the budget deficit worsens the current account. Corsetti and Muller (2006)
stress the role of openness to international trade in the reaction of domestic saving, invest-
ment, and hence the current account to changes in fiscal policy. Corsetti and Muller (2006)
argue that a negative shock to the budget deficit worsens the current account only in rather
open economies. Empirical support for the twin deficit hypothesis is reviewed in section
three.
128
3.3.7 Departing from the infinite horizon representative agent models
The transmission mechanism of fiscal shocks may differ if we depart from modelling fiscal
policy within the infinite horizon representative agent DSGE framework and consider instead
a demographic structure of the economy. For example, when consumers have finite horizons
the effects of a fiscal expansion depends on consumers’ perceptions of the timing of the ex-
pected increase in future taxes (stabilisation programs). In the model of Sutherland (1998),
at a low level of public debt the expected increase in taxes due to a current fiscal expansion
is remote for the current generation allowing for short-run Keynesian expansionary effects.
However, in the case of a fiscal expansion at a high level of public debt, current consumers
expect an imminent increase in taxes within their lifetimes. Therefore, the fiscal expansion
in this situation has a contractionary effect. A similar non-Keynesian effect is advocated by
the hypothesis of expansionary fiscal contraction modelled by Barry and Devereux (2003).
According to this hypothesis, a credible permanent reduction in government consumption
reduces expected future tax liabilities. Consumers in the current generation increase current
consumption by less than future consumption. The real interest rate falls leading to higher
levels of investment and output in the steady state.
Despite the possibility of a non-Keynesian effect of fiscal policy, a Keynesian effect still
can be found in models that combine demographic effects with market imperfections. For
example, Ganelli (2007) and Ganelli (2005) consider overlapping generation models with
sticky prices in a closed economy and an open economy setup respectively. Since the Ricar-
dian equivalence does not hold in these models, a debt-financed tax cut increases households’
wealth boosting private consumption and causing an appreciation of the real exchange rate
in the short-run.
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3.3.8 Fiscal policy rules
While the focus here is discretionary fiscal policy, there is a strand of literature that examines
optimal fiscal policy rules. Reviewing this literature in details is beyond the scope of this
essay. In essence, fiscal policy can be thought of as the commitment of fiscal authority to
follow a certain rule. For example, Taylor (2000) presents a rule that expresses the actual
fiscal balance as a function of output gap and structural fiscal balance. Committing to a
fiscal rule implies that fiscal policy automatically responds to the state of the economy. A
fiscal shock is a disturbance to the fiscal rule. The optimal rule is the rule that maximizes the
model’s welfare function. Additionally, in the presence of nominal rigidities, it is important
to take into account the reaction of the monetary authority to fiscal policy.
Accommodating monetary policy reduces the expansionary effects of fiscal policy. The
DSGE literature is rich of studies that model the interaction of endogenously derived or ex-
ogenously assumed fiscal and monetary policy rules; for instance Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2007) and Adam and Billi (2008). Further, some studies derive the optimal policy mix par-
ticularly for a currency union; for example Beetsma and Jensen (2005), Gali and Monacelli
(2008) and Ferreo (2009).
The traditional way of considering the solvency of the government finance is to check whether
the intertemporal budget constraint holds. More specifically, if the outstanding stock of pub-
lic debt (deflated by prices or nominal output) equals the expected discounted flow of current
and future stream of primary balances, then fiscal policy will be considered to be sustainable.
The standard way of testing this is to examine the components of the government budget
constraint either by testing the stationarity of the statistical process governing an appropri-
ately discounted debt or deficit services1 or testing for cointegration of the components of
1The mean reversion approach for testing sustainability has been used for public debt and the current
account (see Bohn, 2005 and Uctum, Thurston, Uctum, 200X for a review of the literature. Wickens and
Uctum (2000) demonstrate that a negative feedback from debt to trade account is sufficient condition for
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the budget. Bohn (1998, 2005, 2008) criticized this approach for being ad hoc and instead
proposed a framework where the analysis consists in testing the existence of a fiscal policy
reaction function to counteract debt accumulation. Since then, a large body of literature
has examined the relation between the primary balance and public debt.
Most of the analysis has been conducted for the U.S. economy. Recent cross-country stud-
ies show significant fiscal policy responses to debt in the emerging economies, and relatively
weaker ones for high-debt countries (Mendoza and Ostry, 2008). A new study by Mauro,
Romeu, Binder and Zaman (2013), MRBZ from now on, provides an impressive historical
perspective on a panel of countries’ fiscal prudence/profligacy and how it has varied over a
sample that stretches from 1800 to 2011. They find that most advanced countries react to
debt by generating primary surpluses, and thus behave in a way consistent with their in-
tertemporal budget constraint, but the response to debt varies over time and across countries.
Fiscal solvency and tests of government reaction function have also been used in a re-
lated line of literature on fiscal theory of price determination that is pioneered by Woodford
(2003)2. Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001) test this theory by examining the impulse re-
sponse functions from a three-variable VAR consisting of surplus, liabilities and debt among
others. Although a direct test of the government’s reaction function is not the emphasis of
the paper, their empirical results suggest that the U.S. government liabilities are negatively
and significantly related to surpluses independent of ordering in the VAR. They interpret
this as a plausible support for a Ricardian regime where primary surplus adjusts to keep the
budget intertemporally balanced.
sustainability. Also, see Wicken (2008). Bohn (1998) shows that rejection of mean reversion or cointegration
can be consistent with the IBC.
2According to this view, if primary balances adjust continuously to insure that the government’s present-
value budget constraint holds at all time, then this is a regime with conventional monetary policy, which
determines the price level. If primary balances are random and independent of debt levels, then the price
level moves to balance the intertemporal budget constraint. Woodford (2003) calls the first regime Ricardian
and the second regime non-Ricardian. The Ricardian regime is the one where the government systematically
reacts to debt accumulation, and thus ensures that its intertemporal budget condition is satisfied.
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By the nature of the analysis, the time component is an inevitable feature of all these
studies. However, few attempts to capture the time variation in the coefficients. Second,
endogeneity is a problem that has to be addressed. Analyses based on a single equation may
seriously bias results. MRBZ control for nonlinearities by repeating estimation in subsam-
ples determined by structural breaks and rolling windows; but they use a single equation,
which is unable to account for endogeneity and control for cross-country variation. Mendoza
and Ostry (2008) also consider a single equation with constant coefficient estimates, which
ignores endogeneity issues as well as nonlinearities. The VAR approach in Canzoneri et al.
deals with endogeneity but does not consider time variations of coefficients.
To address these concerns we use a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model with
time varying parameters in a Bayesian approach. Relaxing the parameter constancy restric-
tion provides estimates that vary over time reflecting the structural changes, policy variations
and various shocks to the economy. The SVAR structure endogenizes all of the variables and
allows control of the cross-equation dependency.
3.4 Existing Model
In Barro (1979), the government chooses a stream of future tax collections to minimize the
present value of collection costs. Using the first-order conditions, Barro derives an equation
for the growth rate of nominal debt that varies positively with the deviation of government
spending and negatively with income from their respective long-term (normal) trends. Based
on this model, Bohn (1998) considers a reaction function of the form
st = µ+ αbt + φzt + ǫt (3.1)
132
where s is the primary surplus, b is the stock of outstanding public debt and z is a set of
cyclical determinants of the primary surplus representing the Barro variables, such as tem-
porary government spending and deviation of output from its trend. All variables, except
the elements of z, are expressed as ratios to output. The surplus is expected to increase with
deviations of output above its trend and decrease with temporary increases of government
spending. The condition of sustainability is α > 0, a positive feedback from government
debt to the primary surplus. Finding such a coefficient with acceptable statistical confidence
would provide strong evidence that fiscal policy has been on a sustainable path.
However, as we emphasized above, this is a fixed-coefficient model and does not account
for endogeneities that can affect one or more variables. Instead, we turn to the complete
model, which we express as a time-varying structural vector auto regression (SVAR) model.





ΦlYt−l + Et (3.2)
ΓYt = Φ(L)Yt + Et (3.3)
where Y ′t = {st, bt, zt}, Et ∼ i.i.d.N(O,Ω) and the matrix Ω is diagonal. We impose a


















































where we assume that z has only one element, the output gap that captures cyclical vari-
ations. This identification indicates that output gap responds contemporaneously only to
its own shock and not to fiscal shocks, but reacts to them with lag(s). This is a realistic
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assumption, since it describes the response of the real economy to fiscal policy, known to be
slow. Debt responds to its own shock and to the shock to output gap contemporaneously
and with lag to all the shocks. The primary surplus is the policy variable and it reacts
contemporaneously and with lag to its own shock as well as to all shocks.
Equation 3.1 is also consistent with what is called the long-run sustainability condition
derived from the budget constraint of the government:
bt = st + (1 + it − πt − gt)bt−1 (3.5)
where the figure in parentheses is the nominal growth rate-adjusted average yield at which
the government finances its debt, is the inflation rate and g is the real growth rate. All
other variables are expressed as ratios to nominal GDP, as before. In the long run, if the
government stops accumulating debt, it satisfies its budget constraint. Then, the budget
constraint becomes:
st = (1 + it − πt − gt)bt or dt = (πt − gt)bt (3.6)
where d is the deficit-to-GDP ratio. Equation 3.6 states that a country would satisfy its
long-run sustainability criterion if its deficit/GDP ratio equals the growth rate of nominal
GDP multiplied by debt/GDP ratio. In other words, a country could roll over its debt
without paying it back as long as the deficit is consistent with the long-run growth potential
of the economy. We will use the condition in Equation 3.6 as a benchmark to compare the
impulse response functions.
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3.5 Time-varying Coefficient Vector Autoregressive Model
We follow the methodology by Cogley, Sargent and Primiceri (2009), CSP from now on, to
estimate a trivariate VAR of the components of the fiscal reaction function with drifting
parameters. The model now becomes:
Yt = X
′
tθt + et (3.7)
where Yt is a endogenous variable, Xt contains lags of Yt including constants, and θt is a time-
varying coefficient matrix. The error term et follows normal distribution with zero means
and time-varying covariance matrix Rt, that is et ∼ N(O,Rt). Thus, our system allows
stochastic volatility in et. As in CSP, we also assume that the time-varying coefficients θt
follows the random walk with stochastic volatility:
θt = θt−1 + vt
where vt is an error term and vt ∼ N(O,Qt). Adopting the stochastic volatility model of














































































The diagonal elements of HR,t and HQ,t are assumed to be independent, univariate stochastic
volatilities that evolve as:
ln(hR,i,t) = ln(hR,i,t−1) + ηi,t (i=1,2,3)
ln(hQ,i,t) = ln(hQ,i,t−1) + η
′
i,t (i=1,2,3)
where ηi,t and η
′
i,t are standard normal random variables. These specifications are designed
to capture permanent shifts in the innovation of vt, such as the stability in the U.S. economy
(See Stock and Watson, 2005).
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3.5.1 Prior Distributions
The unrestricted prior for the vector of coefficients is:
θt ∼ N(θ̂OLS, ŜOLS)
where θ̂OLS and ŜOLS are the estimates and the variance-covariance matrix from OLS esti-
mation, respectively. The prior for the elements of the covariance matrix is:
ln(hR,i,t) ∼ N(ln(ĥR,i,t), 10) (i=1,2,3)
where ln(hR,i,t) is the estimate of the variance of the residual in the ith variable. Piors for
the block governing Bt are:
bR,ij,t ∼ N(0, 10000I3) (i=1,2,3; j=1,2,3)
where I3 is a three-dimensional identity matrix. By choosing large variances (10 for ln(hR,i,t),
and 10000 for bR,ij,t), CSP allow a wide range of values for ln(hR,i,t) and bR,ij,t. The prior for










For ln(hQ,i,t), bQ,ij,t and σ
2
Q,i, the prior distributions are essentially the same as its counter-





Following CSP, as a Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation, we use Metropolis-
within-Gibbs algorithm to draw from the posterior distribution. In this MCMC simulation,
we iterate Step (1) to (5) (described below) 24,000 times, and first 4,000 draws are dis-
carded. The thinning parameter is chose to be 2 to reduce the autocorrelation among the
draws. However, unlike CSP who chose to discard the drawn parameter whose unit root is
greater than 1, we discard it with greater than 1.005 in order to allow θt to deviate from the
OLS estimate (See Bernanke et al, 2005).
Step (1) Draw of θT ∼ θT |Y T , Q,RT
In this step, we utilize Kalman filter. Let
θt|t ≡ E[θt|t|Y
t, Q,RT ]
Pt|t−1 ≡ V ar[θt|t|Y
t−1, Q,RT ]
Pt|t ≡ V ar[θt|t|Y
t, Q,RT ]
(3.8)
represent conditional means and variances going forward in time. These can be computed






θt|t = θt−1|t−1 +Kt(yt −X
′
tθt−1|t−1)
Pt|t−1 = Pt−1|t−1 +Q




At the end of the sample, this forward recursion delivers the mean and variance for θT :
θT |Y
T , Q,RT ∼ N(θT |T , PT |T )
where N() is the normal distribution function. The remaining element in θT are derived
from a backward recursion, which updates conditional means and variances to reflect the
additional information about θt contained in θt+1. Let
θt|t+1 ≡ E[θt|θt+1, Y
t, Q,RT ]
Pt|t+1 ≡ V ar[θt|θt+1, Y
t−1, Q,RT ]
(3.10)
represent updated estimates of the mean and variance. Because θt is conditionally normal,
these are
θt|t+1 = θt|t + Pt|tP
−1
t+1|t(θt+1 − θt|t)





The updated estimates determine the mean and variance for remaining elements in
θt|θt+1, Y
T , Q,RT ∼ N(θt|t+1, Pt|t+1)
A random trajectory for θT is generated by iterating backward. The backward recursion
starts with a draw of θT . Then, conditional on its realization, θT−1 is drawn, θT−2 is drawn
conditional on the realization of θT−1 , and so on back to the beginning of the sample θ1.
Step (2) Draw of Q ∼ Q|Y T , θT , RT
The next step involves the distribution of Q conditional on the data and other parame-
ter blocks. Conditional on a realization for θT , the VAR parameter innovations, vt, are
observable. Furthermore, the other conditioning variables are irrelevant at this stage,
Q|Y T , θT , RT = Q|Y T , θT
Knowledge of σ is redundant conditional on RT is irrelevant because vt is independent of ηi,t
and η′i,t. Under the linear transition law, vt is i.i.d. normal. The natural conjugate prior in
this case is an inverse-Wishart distribution, with scale parameter Q and degrees of freedom
T0. Given an inverse-Wishart prior and a normal likelihood, the posterior is inverse-Wishart,







T1 = T0 + T
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Step (3) Draw of σ ∼ σ|Y T , θT , Q, β,HT
The third step involves the full conditional distribution for σ|Y T , θT , Q, β,HT . Knowledge
of Q is redundant conditional on θT . The latter conveys information about vt and et, but
both are conditionally independent of the volatility innovations. Thus, conditioning on θT
is also irrelevant. β orthogonalizes Rt and therefore carries information about H
T , but this
is redundant given direct observations on Ht. Given a realization for H
T , one can compute
the scaled volatility innovations, σiηi,t for i = 1, ..., 3. Because the volatility innovations are
mutually independent, we can work with the full conditional density for each. Therefore the
density for σ1 simplifies to
σ1|σ2, σ3, θ




and similarly for σ2 and σ3. The scaled volatility innovations are i.i.d. normal with mean
zero and variance σ2i . Assuming an inverse-gamma prior with scale parameter δ0 and ν0













ν1 = ν0 + T






Step (4) Draw of β ∼ β|Y T , θT , Q, σ,HT
Next, we consider the distribution of β conditional on the data and other parameters. Knowl-
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edge of θT and YT implies knowledge of et, which satisfies
Bet = ut
where ut is a vector of orthogonalized residuals with known error variance Ht. We interpret
this as a system of unrelated regressions. The first equation in the system is the identity
e1,t = u1,t
The second and third equations can be expressed as transformed regressions,
(h−0.52,t e2,t) = β2,1(−h
−0.5
2,t e1,t) + (h
−0.5
2,t u1,t)
(h−0.53,t e3,t) = β3,1(−h
−0.5
3,t e1,t) + β3,2(−h
−0.5
3,t e2,t) + (h
−0.5
3,t u3,t)
with independent standard normal residuals. Once again, many of the conditioning variables
drop out. Q and σ are redundant conditional on θT and HT , respectively, and hTj for j 6= i,
are irrelevant because the elements of ut are independent. Assuming a normal prior for the
regression coefficients in each equation,
βi ∼ N(βi,0, Vi,0) (for i=2 and 3)
the posterior is also normal,
βi|Y











i,0 βi,0 + Z
′
izi)
The variables zi and Zi refer to the left and right-hand variables, respectively, in the trans-
formed regressions.
Step (5) Draw of HT ∼ HT |Y T , θT , Q, σ, β
The final step involves the conditional distribution of the elements of HT . To sample the
stochastic volatilities, we apply the univariate algorithm of Jacquier, et. al. (1994) to each
element of the orthogonalized VAR residuals, u t . The latter are observable conditional
on YT , θT , and B. We can proceed on a univariate basis because the stochastic volatilities
are mutually independent. Jacquier, et. al. adopted a date-by-date blocking scheme and
developed the conditional kernel for
f(hi,t|h−i,t, u
T
i , σi) = f(hi,t|hi,t−1, hi,t+1, u
T
i , σi)
where h−i,t represents the vector of h’s at all other dates. The simplification follows from the
assumption that h it is Markov. Knowledge of Q is redundant given θT , and hTj and σj for
j 6= i, are irrelevant because the stochastic volatilities are independent. By Bayes’ theorem,
the conditional kernel can be expressed as
f(hi,t|hi,t−1, hi,t+1, u
T















Its form follows from the normal form of the conditional likelihood, f(ui,t|hi,t), and the
log-normal form of the log-volatility equation 3.12. The parameters µi,t and σ
2
i,c are the
conditional mean and variance of hi,t implied by Equation 3.12 and knowledge of hi,t−1 and
hi,t+1. In the random walk case, they are




Notice that the normalizing constant is absent. Jacquier, et. al. say the normalizing constant
is costly to compute, and they recommend a Metropolis step instead of a Gibbs step. One
natural way to proceed is to draw a trial value for hi,t from the log-normal density implied by
Equation 3.12, and then use the conditional likelihood f(ui,t|hi,t) to compute the acceptance






(ln hi,t − µi,t)2
2σ2i,c
)























We set hmi,t = h
m−1
i,t if the proposal is rejected. The algorithm is applied on a date-by-date
basis to each of the elements of ut.
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3.6 Data
The data used in this study are quarterly and span the period 1980Q1 to 2013Q1. It thus
covers four different administrations and five recessions. The primary surplus is defined as
federal receipts net of expenditures. The receipts are annualized U.S. federal government
current receipts, and the expenditures are U.S. federal consumption expenditures and gross
investment. Debt is defined as U.S. federal debt held by the public. Both the primary surplus
and the public debt measures are expressed as ratios to nominal GDP (See Figure 3.1). The
fiscal and the GDP data comes from the Global Financial Data, based on FRED database
that compiles it from several sources (Federal Reserve System and various government of-
fices). The output gap is defined in percent of potential GDP (See Figure 3.2), and is from
World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund. We opted for these series rather
than the OECD’s because its length fits our sample and is five years longer than the latter.
Both series move quite closely, except for a small scale factor. The original annual output
gap series were interpolated to quarterly by using a constant-match average methodology.
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3.7 Results
Since our model has time-varying coefficients, the shapes of impulse response functions are
different for each period over the sample. For a comparison, in Figure 3.3, we present the
impulse response function by the standard VAR whose coefficients are constant. The break
lines comprise a 66% Bayesian error band. After a one-percentage exogenous shock to the
public debt, the contemporaneous response of the primary surplus is -0.11 percentage change,
and turns into the positive change after 5.2 quarters. We need to emphasize that the im-
mediate response is negative and even with the 66% Bayesian error band. This implies that
there is no active reaction in the fiscal policy in response to an exogenous shock to the public
debt. This also implies that it takes 5.2 quarters to react actively in the fiscal policy. Since
this result is generated by the constant-coefficient VAR, these show the average response
over the sample.
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Figure 3.3: Impulse Response of Primary Surplus by a Debt Shock [Standard VAR]
Note: The break lines comprise a 66% Bayesian error band. The response is a percentage
change after a 1-percentage exogenous shock to the public debt.
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Now, we turn into our time-varying coefficient model. Figure 3.4 and 3.5 shows the re-
sponses of primary surplus to one-percentage exogenous debt shock in 1985Q4 and 1995Q1,
respectively. We pick these 2 periods for comparison here. In Figure 3.4, the contemporane-
ous response of the primary surplus in 1985Q4 is -0.18 percentage change, and turns into the
positive change after 8.3 quarters. On the other hand, in Figure 3.5, the contemporaneous
response of the primary surplus in 1995Q1 is 0.17 percentage change. These results suggest
two interesting points. One is that in 1985Q4, it’s slightly less active reaction in the fiscal
policy than average compared with Figure 3.3, and it’ll take more time to react. Another
is that, in 1995Q1, there is a positive immediate response in the primary surplus, implying
that the fiscal policy reacts so that it reduce the level of the public debt.
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Figure 3.4: Impulse Response of Primary Surplus by a Debt Shock in 1985Q4
Note: The break lines comprise a 66% Bayesian error band. The response is a percentage
change after a 1-percentage exogenous shock to the public debt.
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Figure 3.5: Impulse Response of Primary Surplus by a Debt Shock in 1995Q1
Note: The break lines comprise a 66% Bayesian error band. The response is a percentage
change after a 1-percentage exogenous shock to the public debt.
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We would like to show the contemporaneous responses of primary surplus after a one-
percentage exogenous debt shock for all periods over the sample. In Figure 3.6, We plot these
contemporaneous responses over the sample. The break lines comprise a 66% Bayesian error
band. Whether the immediate response of the primary surplus is positive or not is striking
in Figure 3.6. It is positive in 1992Q1 to 2000Q4, and also in 2008Q2 to 2013Q1, while it
is negative in 1981Q1 to 1991Q4, and also in 2001Q1 to 2008Q1. The positive responses
suggest that the fiscal policy is more reactive to reduce the level of the public debt. On the
other hand, the negative responses suggest there is no active response immediately after an
exogenous debt shock.
We also present the responses of primary surplus for all periods in the sample at the
different horizons in the impulse response functions. Figure 3.7 shows the responses at the
1-quarter horizon after an exogenous debt shock for all periods. Figure 3.8 and 3.9 show
those at the 1-year and 5-year horizon, respectively. In Figure 3.7 to 3.9, it is interesting
to see how long it takes when a negative response turns into positive, especially in 1981Q1-
1991Q4 and 2001Q1-2008Q1. Figure 3.7 and 3.8 show that it take more than one years to
turn into a positive response in the primary surplus. Figure 3.9 shows that it turns into
positive after 5 years.
First, these striking differences in the sign of the fiscal responses relate to the recessions.
There is a tendency that the sign of the response switches (See Figure 3.6) during or around
the time of recession. A negative response turns into positive after the early-1990s recession
and during the most recent recession. A positive response turns into negative right before
the early 1980s and the early 2000s recessions. In the other word, our result suggests that,
in the early 1990s and the most recent recessions, the fiscal policy reaction was more active
to reduce the level of the public debt, compared with two other recessions in the early 1980s
and the early 2000s. Notably, the negative fiscal policy reactions start a couple of quarters
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before the recessions in the early 1980s and the early 2000s.
Second, the differences in the sign of the fiscal responses also crucially relates to the pres-
idential administrations. In our sample period, Ronald Reagan’s administration is in 1981-
1988, George Bush in 1989-1992, Bill Clinton in 1993-2000, George W. Bush in 2001-2008,
Barack Obama in 2008-2013. The sign of the fiscal response nearly matches the Democrat
or Republican administration. Our results show that the Democrat administrations’ fiscal
policies had reacted more actively and immediately to an exogenous debt shock than the
Republican ones.
Third, it might be more convincing when we relate these differences in the fiscal policy
reaction to the war time. The 1980s is the time of Cold War. In 1990-1991, there was First
Gulf War. In 2001 to 2008, there were wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. During the war time,
the government needs to increase the expenditures in the national defense budget. Thus, it
might be more difficult to immediately conduct a reactive fiscal policy to reduce the level of
the public debt in those periods.
152













 1981  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  2010  2013
Year
Note: The break lines comprise a 66% Bayesian error band. The contemporaneous
responses of the primary surplus after a 1-percentage exogenous shock to the public debt are
plotted over the sample.
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 1981  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  2010  2013
Year
Note: The break lines comprise a 66% Bayesian error band. The responses of the primary
surplus at the 1-quarter horizon after a 1-percentage exogenous shock to the public debt are
plotted over the sample.
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 1981  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  2010  2013
Year
Note: The break lines comprise a 66% Bayesian error band. The responses of the primary
surplus at the 1-year horizon after a 1-percentage exogenous shock to the public debt are
plotted over the sample.
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 1981  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  2010  2013
Year
Note: The break lines comprise a 66% Bayesian error band. The responses of the primary
surplus at the 5-year horizon after a 1-percentage exogenous shock to the public debt are
plotted over the sample.
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Now, We turn into the response of output gap to see the effects on the real economy.
Figure 3.10 shows the responses at the 1-quarter horizon after a one-percentage exogenous
debt shock over the periods. The break lines comprise a 66% Bayesian error band. We
also present the responses of outgap over the sample at the different horizons in the impulse
response functions. Figure 3.11 and 3.12 shows the responses at the 1-year and the 5-year
horizons, respectively.
Figure 3.10 shows that there are positive effects on output gap in some periods. In term
of the magnitude of positive effect, it’s very small, as Figure 3.10 shows approximately 0.01
percentage point gain in output gap at most. However, it turns into a more positive effect
over time. Our result shows up to 0.05 percentage point gain 1 year after the exogenous debt
shock in Figure 3.11, and up to 0.6 percentage point gain 5 years after the shock in Figure
3.12.
To relate this to reactive fiscal policy, the periods of positive effects on output gap in
Figure 3.10 are roughly matches when the government conduct an immediately reactive
fiscal policy we discussed above. The exceptions are in 1981, 1990, and 2000. Eash period
is right before the recession. This might be because an immediate reaction in fiscal policy
to an exogenous debt shock is not sufficient for a positive effect on output gap. However,
when we focus on the recessions in the early 1980s and the early 2000s, the negative effect
on output gap are getting more negative in Figure 3.10 to 3.12 along with no immediate
reactions in fiscal policy in response to the shock in thses periods. These negative effects
even continues after the recessions along with continuing no immediate reaction in fiscal
policy. These results suggest that such a policy leaves more negative effect on output gap
during a recession.
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 1981  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  2010  2013
Year
Note: The break lines comprise a 66% Bayesian error band. The responses of the primary
surplus at the 5-year horizon after a 1-percentage exogenous shock to the public debt are
plotted over the sample.
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 1981  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  2010  2013
Year
Note: The break lines comprise a 66% Bayesian error band. The responses of the primary
surplus at the 5-year horizon after a 1-percentage exogenous shock to the public debt are
plotted over the sample.
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 1981  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  2010  2013
Year
Note: The break lines comprise a 66% Bayesian error band. The responses of the primary
surplus at the 5-year horizon after a 1-percentage exogenous shock to the public debt are
plotted over the sample.
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3.8 Robustness Check
In checking the robustness of the model, we test whether our time-varying VAR model with
stochastic volatility is a superior model to the standard constant-coefficient VAR model.
We will use the marginal density of data (MDD). Its use is a common practice to find an
optimized number of unobservable states in Markov switching literature such as Sims and
Zha (2006).
Since there exists no analytical solution of MDD in this model, we apply the approxi-
mation method of Chib (1995) to our analysis. See more details in Appendix B. We reports
MDDs in Table 3.1. The results show that the model with one common factor and three
country-specific factors has the highest MDD -100129, indicating that it is a superior model
to the standard VAR model.
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Table 3.1: Robustness Test
Marginal Density
Restriction of Data
Standard Constant-coefficient VAR Model -100129
Time-varying Coefficient VAR Model 3210
The numbers are in logarithm. A higher number indicates a superior model.
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3.9 Conclusion
The sustainability of governments’ fiscal stance has been a subject of active and ongoing de-
bate in academic research since the debt crises of the 1980s. In a broadly adopted approach,
if the government generates a primary surplus (excluding debt services) in response to a rise
in public debt, then the budget is deemed to be solvent. This is a sufficient condition for
sustainability of fiscal policy. In this study, we proposed to examine the government’s reac-
tion function by remedying 2 issues in existing literature. We allow the government reaction
to vary over time and take into account endogeneities by casting the analysis in a multi-
variate framework. Our findings are: (1) the response of the government’s primary surplus
to a 1-percent exogenous debt shock displays first a deterioration of the primary balance
in 1981Q1-1991Q4 and 2001Q1-2008Q1. It followed by a sustained improvement, consistent
with the definition of a fiscally responsible policy. (2) However, there are the periods when
there is a sustained improvement from beginning without any deteriorations of the primary
balance, that is in 1992Q1-2000Q4 and 2008Q2- 2013Q1. (3) These differences in the fiscal
policy reactions might be due to recession and wars. If some emergency expenditures are
needed during recessions or wars, it would be harder to make fiscal policy more sustainable.
(4) The effect on output gap becomes more negative during the resession along with no
immediate reaction in fiscal policy to reduce the level of debt in response to an exogenous
debt shock. (5) The robustness test shows that our time-varying coefficient model is more
superior to the standard VAR model in terms of marginal density of data.
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Appendix A: Data
The numbers in parenthesis shows data transformation (1=level, 2=difference, 3=percentage
change, 4=change in percentage change).
U.S.
1. Federal funds rate (2)
2. Nominal effective exchange rate (4)
3. Real effective exchange rate (4)
4. M2 (3)
5. Short-term government bond rate (2)
6. Long-term government bond rate (2)
7. Deposit rate (2)
8. Lending rate (2)
9. Spread of short-term government bond rate (1)
10. Spread of long-term government bond rate (1)
11. Spread of deposit rate (1)
12. Spread of lending rate (1)
13. Stock index (4)
14. Producer price index (4)
15. Consumer price index (4)
16. Industrial production (3)
17. Exported good price (4)






1. Overnight call rate (2)
2. Nominal effective exchange rate (4)
3. Real effective exchange rate (4)
4. M2 (3)
5. Short-term government bond rate (2)
6. Long-term government bond rate (2)
7. Deposit rate (2)
8. Lending rate (2)
9. Spread of short-term government bond rate (1)
10. Spread of long-term government bond rate (1)
11. Spread of deposit rate (1)
12. Spread of lending rate (1)
13. Stock index (4)
14. Producer price index (4)
15. Consumer price index (4)
16. Industrial production (3)
17. Exported good price (4)





1. Overnight call rate (2)
2. Nominal effective exchange rate (4)
3. Real effective exchange rate (4)
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5. Short-term government bond rate (2)
6. Long-term government bond rate (2)
7. Deposit rate (2)
8. Lending rate (2)
9. Spread of short-term government bond rate (1)
10. Spread of long-term government bond rate (1)
11. Spread of deposit rate (1)
12. Spread of lending rate (1)
13. Stock index (4)
14. Producer price index (4)
15. Consumer price index (4)
16. Industrial production (3)
17. Exported good price (4)





1. Overnight call rate (2)
2. Nominal effective exchange rate (4)
3. Real effective exchange rate (4)
4. M0 (3)
5. Short-term government bond rate (2)
6. Long-term government bond rate (2)
7. Deposit rate (2)
8. Lending rate (2)
9. Spread of short-term government bond rate (1)
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10. Spread of long-term government bond rate (1)
11. Spread of deposit rate (1)
12. Spread of lending rate (1)
13. Stock index (4)
14. Producer price index (4)
15. Consumer price index (4)
16. Industrial production (3)
17. Exported good price (4)





1. Overnight call rate (2)
2. Nominal effective exchange rate (4)
3. Real effective exchange rate (4)
5. Short-term government bond rate (2)
6. Long-term government bond rate (2)
7. Deposit rate (2)
8. Lending rate (2)
9. Spread of short-term government bond rate (1)
10. Spread of long-term government bond rate (1)
11. Spread of deposit rate (1)
12. Spread of lending rate (1)
13. Stock index (4)
14. Producer price index (4)
15. Consumer price index (4)
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1. Overnight call rate (2)
2. Nominal effective exchange rate (4)
3. Real effective exchange rate (4)
5. Short-term government bond rate (2)
6. Long-term government bond rate (2)
7. Deposit rate (2)
8. Lending rate (2)
9. Spread of short-term government bond rate (1)
10. Spread of long-term government bond rate (1)
11. Spread of deposit rate (1)
12. Spread of lending rate (1)
13. Stock index (4)
14. Producer price index (4)
15. Consumer price index (4)
16. Industrial production (3)
17. Exported good price (4)





1. Overnight call rate (2)
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2. Nominal effective exchange rate (4)
3. Real effective exchange rate (4)
4. M2 (3)
5. Short-term government bond rate (2)
6. Long-term government bond rate (2)
7. Deposit rate (2)
8. Lending rate (2)
9. Spread of short-term government bond rate (1)
10. Spread of long-term government bond rate (1)
11. Spread of deposit rate (1)
12. Spread of lending rate (1)
13. Stock index (4)
14. Producer price index (4)
15. Consumer price index (4)
16. Industrial production (3)
17. Exported good price (4)





Appendix B: Approximation Method of Marginal Likelihood
To compute MDD, we begin with the posterior density function of parameter:
p(θ̃| XT ) =
p(XT | θ̃ ) p(θ̃)
p(XT )
where p(·) is a probability density function, and θ̃ is any θ ∈ Θ Then, the logarithm of MDD
can be written as follow:
log p(XT ) = log p(XT | θ∗) + log p(θ∗)− log p(θ∗| XT ) (3.13)
Note that we evaluate the MDD at the posterior mode (θ∗) where it is most efficient.
The prior distribution can be applied to p(θ∗). The likelihood density can be expressed as
follows:




L(Xt|Yt, θ ) (3.14)
where







(Xt − λyYt − λfF
∗
t|t−1)




For the posterior density p(θ∗| XT ), we approximate it using Chib’s (1995) method. In this
method, we decompose it as follows:
p(θ∗| XT ) = p(φ∗, Q∗, λ∗, R∗| XT )
= p(φ∗| Q∗, λ∗, R∗,XT )p(Q∗| λ∗, R∗,XT )p(λ∗| R∗,XT )p(R∗| XT ) (3.15)
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Due to the ergodicity theorem, one can obtain the following almost sure convergence in three






p(R∗| φ(m), Q(m), λ(m),FT (m),XT ) −→a.s. p(R
∗| XT )
where M is the number of iterations in the Gibbs sampler.
Since p(R∗| φ(m), Q(m), λ(m),FT (m)),XT ) is already available in the outputs in the Gibbs
sampler, obtaining this approximation requires no additional effort. However, we need to






p(λ∗| φ(m1), Q(m1), R∗,FT (m1),XT ) −→a.s. p(λ
∗| R∗,XT )
where FT (m1) ∼ FT | φ(m1), Q(m1), λ∗, R∗,XT , QT (m1) ∼ FT | φ(m1), λ∗, R∗,FT (m1),XT , and






p(Q∗| φ(m2), λ∗, R∗,FT (m2),XT ) −→a.s. p(Q
∗| λ∗, R∗,XT )






p(φ∗, Q∗, λ∗, R∗| FT (m3),XT ) −→a.s. p(φ
∗, Q∗, λ∗, R∗| XT )
where FT (m3) ∼ FT | φ∗, Q∗, λ∗, R∗,XT .
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Appendix C: Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model: Log Linear
Approximation
x̂t denotes deviation from its steady state in percent. κ ≡ (1 − ξ)(1 − βξ)/ξ(1 + ϕθ) and
κ̃ ≡ (1− ξ̃)(1− βξ̃)/ξ̃































yt = γyH,t + (1− γ)yN,t
y∗t = γy
∗
F,t + (1− γ)y
∗
N,t
yH,t = (1− α)αη(τH,t − τF,t) + (1− γ)[αxt + (1− α)x
∗
t ] + αct + (1− α)c
∗
t
y∗F,t = (1− α)αη(τF,t − τH,t) + (1− γ)[αx
∗
t + (1− α)xt] + αc
∗
t + (1− α)ct















τH,t = τH,t−1 + πF,t − πH,t












F,t − (1− α)(τF,t − τF,t−1)



























mcH,t = ϕyH,t − (1 + ϕ)at − λt + (1− α)τH,t + (1− γ)xt
mc∗F,t = ϕy
∗




t + (1− α)τF,t + (1− γ)x
∗
t
mcN,t = ϕyN,t − (1 + ϕ)at − λt − γxt
mc∗N,t = ϕy
∗







πt = γπH,t + (1− γ)πN,t + γ(1− α)(τH,t − τH,t−1)
π∗t = γπ
∗
F,t + (1− γ)π
∗
N,t + γ(1− α)(τF,t − τF,t−1)
πF,t − δ̃πF,t−1 = κ̃Et
[

















H,t−1 −∆et + πH,t − π
∗
H,t
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ)(φπEtπt+1 + φyyt) + ǫt
i∗t = ρ
















t = Et∆et+1 + µ
bt = β
−1bt−1 + nxt
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